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ABSTRACT

Pommerening, Amy M. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. The Time of Liberation:
Angela Davis’s Prison Abolition and Giorgio Agamben’s Coming Community. Major
Professor: Leonard Harris.

The project explores the ethical, social, and political subject of incarceration. I
investigate Angela Davis’s multifaceted critique of the prison industrial complex –
focusing primarily on the tenets of racism, classism, and capitalism – and take an
interdisciplinary approach to advancing her call for prison abolition by way of Giorgio
Agamben’s radical adjustments to traditional discourses about ontology in his work The
Coming Community. Agamben’s rendering of ontology in terms of impotentiality and
indifference, when put in dialogue with Davis, exposes latent and unexplored philosophic
suggestions Davis is making – specifically regarding a non-normative interpretation of
temporality and an operation of liberation best understood as indefinite rather than finite
and attainable. Ultimately, the poetic re-thinking Agamben applies to ontology and its
political consequences serve as one blueprint for the kind of cognitive re-orientation vital
for the prison abolitionist project: abolishing the conditions which allow for the prison
industrial complex to be an unquestioned, inevitable part of social reality. Experimenting
with thinkers that have seemingly disparate concerns and styles creates a space for more
imaginative approaches to potentially mitigating limited, oppressive modes of thought,
practices, and institutions.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

i. Imagining the unimaginable
The problematic – the what-is-at-stake – in the current investigation is another
way of living: an alternative way of thinking, acting, communicating, and organizing
ourselves within local and global communities. Though “alternative way of living”
seems absurdly broad, in the context of the current project, it is quite specific. To purport
the following investigation has at stake an alternative way of living implies that modes of
living as they are unfolding now are worthy of critique and displacement. What follows
is an investigation into prison abolition, and therefore, it is an investigation for a way of
life that does not include the mechanisms and the use of the criminal justice and penal
incarceration systems. Time and temporality play a major role in understanding the
alternative way of living without prisons. The critique is not only of contemporary
experience (personal, social, political, ideological) but also includes the dynamic of
historical remembering (experiences of pastness which are and remain inseparable from
the emerging now) as well as the dismissal of unimagined futures.
I argue that Agamben, in his book The Coming Community,1 demonstrates one
possible way to alter our conceptual framework that would assist in Davis’s goal of

1

Agamben has written extensively in the fields of social and political philosophy, aesthetics, theology, and
the history of philosophy; this project focuses primarily on one, often overlooked/ignored book, The
Coming Community.
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prison abolition. The (nearly) inconceivable idea that Davis is suggesting we imagine
requires not only a complicated proposal but one which deals with some of our most
fundamental concepts as human beings: existence as such, identity, community, and
temporality. Alex Murray writes in Giorgio Agamben, “Agamben’s thought is
characterized by the depth it provides in thinking through our contemporary moment, and
on the importance that it places on imagining the world anew” (1). Agamben’s “world
anew” defines ontology as impotentiality, and this becomes the basis for what he calls the
coming community: a community not defined with respect to predicate criteria and,
therefore, one that consequently would abolish the inclusion/exclusion dialectic. These
alterations, occasionally supplemented by references to religious and philosophic
traditions of Southeast Asia, offer one example of changes to our thinking that would
allow us to begin to imagine Davis’s prisonless existence.
Though the problematic – the what-is-at-stake – is an alternative prisonless mode
of existing, the practice of (criminal) imprisonment is not an isolated operation but is a
segment of an immense constellation of oppressive and unjust practices. The notion of a
constellation is fitting for helping readers understand the following project, and the
thinkers it focuses on: Angela Davis (1944-present) and Giorgio Agamben (1942-present).
A constellation is a grouping of stars that structures an imaginary figure traced on the
face of the sky. It is an identifiable creation of the on-looker and is a product of the onlooker’s imagination. The constellation is one of an infinite number of possible
constellations and is formed through a process of connecting: certain points are
emphasized and then connected, or grouped, to make a figure. However, this
connectedness is wholly unconnected; that is, when one looks at the sky and creates a
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constellation or identifies one which has been previously imagined, there are no lines
actually connecting the points. The Big Dipper does not have a real, tangible border; it is
a series of unconnected points.
The constellation is pertinent to this project for a number of reasons. First,
individually, Davis and Agamben draw on a number of discourses, events, and analyses
to structure their respective critiques regarding current modes of thinking and living. Just
as the stars and the on-looker are never static, so it is the case that the points which Davis
and Agamben highlight (and their positions with respect to these points) are never static.
Davis asks in Are Prisons Obsolete?: “Why do we take prisons for granted?” and
“Why should it be so difficult to imagine alternatives to our current system of
incarceration?” (15, 105). Incarceration facilities are designations which unquestioningly
populate the landscape. The truly revolutionary and challenging aspect of Davis’s prison
abolition is to imagine existing in a world without prisons. She is attempting to create
and introduce a never-before imagined constellation. In Chapter Two, we will see why
and how Davis defends the importance of this task. The apparatuses that fuel the use and
proliferation of the modern forms of criminal, social, and political imprisonment as well
as the resultant social, economic, and political disappearance constitute and perpetuate
unnecessary and indefensible human suffering. Eliminating the conditions that sustain
the practice of imprisonment, then, could be conceived of as an alternative mode of
existing with a decreased level of human suffering. Using the imagination in an
unlimited, as opposed to limited, manner is the impetus to creating a prisonless society.
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ii. Proceedings
The investigation of the problematic will begin with an explication of Davis’s
prison abolition and is organized around each term: prison and abolition. Both terms
undergo a referential mutation in Davis. Prison is no longer “an isolated institution” but
a “set of relationships that comprise the prison industrial complex” (APO 106). Davis
demonstrates that there are other critical factors which need to be eliminated in order for
prisons to truly be abolished.2 Since these factor are inseparable from the way humans
are currently living, prison abolition is thus only possible with broader perceptual and
social transformations. Furthermore, abolition, for Davis, includes both negative and
positive processes. She positively proposes the creation of an abolition democracy – an
alternative, prisonless society.
Davis claims that we must think poetically in order to imagine a prisonless society
and thus begin the process for organizing ourselves in a way to render prisons obsolete.
She admits to not providing a comprehensive step-by-step plan as to how we can alter our
conceptual framework in such a way in which humans can begin to imagine the
possibility of experiencing life without prisons.
Chapter Three will outline one of Agamben’s specific alterations to our patterns
of thinking regarding ontology that has communicative and behavioral repercussions.
Ontology, politics and literature, and the relationships between them, are
the crucial topics of Agamben’s work…[and] arguably what emerges in

2

Davis’s critique of the prison industrial complex (PIC) largely focuses on racial and economic
considerations in the United States. The feminist/gendered, imperial, and xenophobic aspects of Davis’s
analysis are given little to no attention. This is not to suggest race, gender, class, imperialism, culture,
capitalism-neoliberalism are divisible in her works on the PIC. They coalesce on micro and macro scales
for Davis.
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Agamben is a move towards a ‘poetics,’ a form of thinking that is not tied
to the limitations given to these areas, instead moving beyond the
entrapment of thought. (Murray 5)
Though Agamben does not specifically address Davis nor the notion of prison abolition,
Agamben supplements Davis in a way which provides an answer to Davis’s question of
what conceptual changes could garner the type of re-orientation needed to begin to
imagine a prisonless existence (i.e. coming community).
Using Agamben as an experimental aid to Davis’s prison abolitionism actually
exposes some latent and unexplored philosophic suggestions in Davis regarding
temporality, which are outlined in Chapter Four. In Infancy and History: On the
Deconstruction of Experience, Agamben makes the claim that “the original task of a
genuine revolution, therefore is never merely to ‘change the world,’ but also – and above
all – to ‘change time’” (99). Davis asserts that prison abolition is both existent in the
present and in the future. Scholars of Davis’s work have yet to adequately account for
this non-linear temporality; it is a complicated philosophic claim. Agamben’s concept of
the coming community gives us a way of thinking through Davis’s claim with a revised
ontological lens grounded in impotentiality. Davis’s temporal assertions compliment and
align with her claim that the struggle for liberation is indefinite.
Chapter Five focuses on modes of resistance. In Davis’s writings about political
prisoners and her historical understanding of the struggles for black liberation, she
gestures towards implicating the state as a potential locus to concentrate resistance. A
mode of resistance that refuses to become placated or absorbed by changes in the law
while simultaneously holding at the forefront the original target of the political

6
dissenter’s criticism (i.e. the state) could be a viable route for realizing prison abolition
and ultimately undermining what Davis describes as “the ravages of global capitalism”
altogether (AD 89). Agamben uses the incident at Tiananmen Square as a paradigm for
effective resistance against the state. Davis’s own prison abolitionism opens up the
potential for rendering the state inoperable – using Agamben’s words – and prison
abolitionists should consider the mode of resistance Agamben describes using Tiananmen
to re-structure their own approaches to social justice activism.

7

CHAPTER 2. ANGELA DAVIS AND PRISON ABOLITION

i. Introduction
Davis claims that we must think poetically – that is, more complexly than our
current conceptual frameworks allow – in order to imagine a prisonless society and thus
begin the process for organizing ourselves (i.e. creating a community) in a way to render
prisons obsolete. Davis’s prison abolitionism is a constellation of arguments and looks
broadly at the issues which contributed to the creation and continued proliferation of
prisons: capitalism, racism, sexism, gender repression, militarism, xenophobia, and
nationalism. Davis critiques these institutions and ideologies and argues for their
destruction. At the same time, prison abolition, according to Davis, is not exclusively a
negative or destructive process. Positively, Davis proposes in Abolition Democracy:
Beyond Empire, Prisons, and Torture the creative re-organization of “networks for
resistance”3 and “communities of struggle” as a means for dismantling the existent
conditions that allow for the inevitability of prisons (121, 108). Moreover, Davis
positively proposes the creation of an abolition democracy – her term for the imagined,
prisonless society. The destruction is accompanied by construction of alternative
economic, governmental, and institutional forms.

3

Resistance will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

8
Prison abolition is fundamentally a struggle for liberation. However, liberation
for the prison abolitionist is not reserved for incarcerated individuals. Rather, it is a more
extensive existential human liberation with the imagination as the impetus for altering our
modes of awareness and communication, which allows for radically different possibilities
for being in the world.

ii. Prison abolition
On one level, what prison abolition denotes seems obvious: to abolish or
eradicate prison. Though this is not technically incorrect, such an understanding is
grossly incomplete if by prison one thinks only of a punitive architectural structure
containing people accused or convicted of crimes and abolition as only a negative
process. These associations are part of a multifarious network of meanings. In order to
comprehend what Davis means by prison abolition, a detailed analysis of the terms
prison and abolition are needed.

ii.a. Prison and the prison industrial complex
Prison, as it is used in prison abolition, refers to the prison industrial complex
(PIC): the architectural sites of all types of punitive incarceration4 and surveillance as
well as the economic, governmental, ideological, and cultural values that created, permit,
and support the continual use of such facilities and the criminal justice system more
4

In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Prisons is overseen by the Department of Justice and incudes
public and private federal prisons. In addition, each state has a Department of Corrections in charge of
correctional facilities including public and private local, county, and state jails and prisons. Juvenile
detention centers are also part of the Department of Corrections. Immigration detention centers are
under the jurisdiction of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency of the Department of
Homeland Security.
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broadly. The PIC is not only about prisons proper but is meant to include multiple kinds
of incarceration facilities and surveillance.5 For the United States, this includes: local
and county jails, juvenile detention centers, state and federal prisons, work-release
centers, military prisons and black sites, immigrant detention centers, Indian country
adult and youth detention centers, wilderness camps, training-schools, psychiatric
facilities, halfway houses, house arrest, parole, and probation.6 The term prison
industrial complex itself is pejorative in tone and was first used in 1995 by Mike Davis
for an article written in The Nation. It indicates a critical approach to interpreting the
practice of incarcerating people for criminal punishment or while awaiting charge and
verdict. According to Davis, PIC is used to shift the “attention from the prison, perceived
as an isolated institution, to the set of relationships that comprise” the criminal justice
system and society more broadly (APO 106).
The phrase prison industrial complex is a modification of an early term military
industrial complex (MIC), which entered broad, public discourse when former President
of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower used the phrase in his public farewell address
on January 17, 1961. President Eisenhower said, “In the councils of government, we
must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought,
by the military industrial-complex.” One often cited manifestation of the MIC, according
to Katherine A. Neill and Mathew J. Gable, is “the way in which military buildup during
Mechthild Nagel and Anthony J. Nocella II in their “Introduction” to The End of Prisons: Reflections
from the Decarceration Movement define prison as “an institution or system that oppresses and does not
allow freedom for a particular group” (3). Included for Nagel and Nocella in this definition are
spaces/structures such as daycare centers and parks, among others.
6
In Prison Privatization: The Many Facets of a Controversial Industry (Volume I: The Environment of
Private Prisons), Anne Lee explains in “Private Prisons and Community Corrections” the term community
corrections is sometimes used to indicate “probation and parole supervision as well as other intermediate
sanction such as halfway houses, house arrest with electronic monitoring, community service and monetary
fines” (223).
5
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the Cold War has led to a situation in which the U.S. government is now almost
compelled to sustain mass production of weapons and an enormous military
infrastructure” (94). The MIC extends beyond the development and production of
weapons and maintaining basic operations of the military. James Ledbetter, in
Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military-industrial Complex,
adds, the MIC is “a network of public and private forces that combine a profit motive
with the planning and implementation of strategic policy” (6). The idea is that multiple
public and private apparatuses monetarily depend upon the military (e.g. defense
contractors, military technology developers, military personnel) and thus have an interest
in military policy and ventures for reasons other than threats to national sovereignty or
humanitarian concerns.
The PIC adopts a structurally similar criticism and applies it to the criminal
justice system, but it is important to keep in mind, as Davis explains, the “relationship
between the military industrial complex and the prison industrial complex” could be
called symbiotic since “these two complexes mutually support and promote each other
and often share technologies” (APO 86). Though the particular operations of the PIC are
contextual, central to the general critique is: 1) the role of capitalism, particularly the
mechanisms of imperial capitalism of the 19th century and neoliberalism of the 20th and
21st centuries; 2) social control. In The Prison Industrial Complex and the Global
Economy, Eve Goldberg and Linda Evans see the PIC as “an interweaving of private
business and government interests” (7). Interests in profit, social and political power, and
maintaining the status-quo, not the threat of criminal behavior to society, are aspects
underlying the practice of incarceration. Recently, the term corrections-commercial
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complex (CCC) has been introduced as an alternative to the PIC to further emphasize the
profit interest of commercial enterprises involved in the practice of penal incarceration.
In “The Corrections-Commercial complex: A High-Stakes, Low-Risk Business,” Neill
and Gable define CCC as “a subgovernmental arrangement between three coalitions of
interested groups: private corporations (the prison industry), corrections professional
organizations, and government agencies” (89).
Before addressing specific ways in which commercial, or profit, interests are
fueling and benefitting from incarceration, it is important to briefly outline the role of
neoliberalism. Rose M. Brewer and Nancy A. Heitzeg in their article “The Racialization
of Crime and Punishment: Criminal Justice, Color-Blind Racism, and the Political
Economy of the Prison Industrial Complex” state that “multinational globalization in
search of cheaper and cheaper labor and profit maximization is part and parcel of the
growth of the prison industrial complex” (625). In very basic terms, neoliberalism refers
to globalization, or a global integration, of the economy. As business entities secured
cheaper labor outside the United States, laborers and local economies reliant upon the
skilled and unskilled jobs saw personal wealth, opportunities for economic security and
social mobility, public funds to invest back into the community, and social safety nets
rapidly erode. Moreover, in “Class, Race, and Hyperincarceration in Revanchist
America,” Loïc Wacquant details how the “postindustrial economic transition…shifted
employment from manufacturing to services, from central city to suburb, and from
Rustbelt to the Sunbelt and low-wage foreign countries” (81). Immigration patterns of
corporations in search of cheap labor abroad as well as domestic need for cheap labor are
significant factors in the PIC.
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There are many ways that commercial enterprises profit from incarceration. One
example is the use of inmate labor. In “The High Costs of Profit: Racism, Classism and
Interests against Prison Privatization,” Nancy A. Heitzeg documents a portion of the
companies which use prison labor:
AT&T Wireless, Boeing, Compaq, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Honeywell,
IBM, Intel, Levy, Lucent Technologies, Macy’s, Microsoft, Motorola,
Nordstroms, Nortel, Northern Telecom, Pierre Cardin, Revlon, Starbucks,
Target Stores, Texas Instrument, 3Com, TWA, Victoria Secret, and more.
(38)
Inmate labor is not an employment training program; that is, companies that use
incarcerated individuals as laborers do so with no intention of providing employment
after release. Inmate labor reduces a company’s labor costs through low wages. The
location and type of incarceration facility as well as the particular company using inmates
as laborers are variables that contribute to the wage rate. Generally, wages range
between “two cents to two dollars per hour” (Heitzeg 36).7
Commercial enterprises are not the only entities which benefit from cheap inmate
labor.8 State and local municipalities use low-paid and unpaid inmates to maintain public
parks and buildings; this is in addition to state and local municipalities benefitting from
forced community service penalties of non-incarcerated people that serves no

Heitzeg later says, “[c]heap inmate labor, as low as twenty-one cents per hour, produces everything from
blue jeans to auto parts, electronics and toys, computer circuit boards, and packaged plastic eating utensils
for fast-food restaurants” (41).
8
Abe Louise Young, in an online article published on July 21, 2010 for The Nation titled “BP Hires Prison
Labor to Clean Up Spill While Costal Residents Struggle,” found that in Louisiana: “Prisons and parish
jails provide free daily labor to the state and private companies like BP, while also operating their own
factories and farms, where inmates earn between zero and forty cents an hour.”
7
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rehabilitative or educational purpose.9 The Federal government also benefits monetarily;
cheap inmate labor is “the major supplier for the U.S. military, ranking among the top
fifty suppliers for the army alone” (Heitzeg 38).
In addition to low wages, commercial enterprises profit from using inmate labor
in other ways. Inmates are not guaranteed the protection of federal labor standards.
Leslie Taylor-Gover and Robert T. Carey explain that businesses using inmate labor:
…do not have to pay for benefits…or work related injuries, and they do
not have to negotiate with labor unions or federal agencies that regulate
equal employment and discrimination. The companies are also protected
from lawsuits that may be filed by prisoners. (82)
Companies do not have to provide health care or retirement benefits, do not have to pay
worker compensation for injuries sustained while working, which would raise the
company’s worker compensation insurance rates, and inmates are prohibited from
forming unions or filing lawsuits directly against the companies.10
Private firms are also contracted to provide services within incarceration facilities.
“These include food service (Sodexho is the largest provider), phone service,11 privatized
health care and treatment provided by managed care corporations…,conservative
Christian religious programming,” drug testing suppliers, and security and surveillance
9

In the state of Tennessee, as outlined in the Tennessee Comprehensive Driver License Manual, individuals
with no prior criminal record convicted of Driving Under the Influence (DUI), which applies to alcohol,
illicit drugs, prescription drugs, and over-the-counter medications, are sentenced to mandatory jail time,
must pay a fine, and are subject to loss of license and/or restricted license. Additionally, Tennessee also
“requires as a condition of probation, litter pick-up for three eight-hour shifts. While removing litter, the
offender has to wear a vest or other clothing displaying the message: ‘I am a DRUNK DRIVER’” (81).
10
Tax credits and subsidies such as Prison Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP) are further
examples of the financial benefits for companies using inmate labor.
11
“Phoning Home: Prison Telecommunications in a Deregulatory Age” in Volume II of Prison
Privatization: The Many Facets of a Controversial Industry by Stephen Raher gives an extensive account
of the phone service “provided” for inmates.
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services (Heitzeg 39). The goal for these service providers is to secure contracts with
incarceration facilities in order continue to remain in business and make a profit. The
viability of such private firms relies upon the existence of incarceration facilities.
Finally, the most obvious profit-motivating feature of the PIC is the use of private,
for-profit prison corporations.12 Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) formed in
1983 as the “first contemporary corrections provider” (Neill & Gable 92). It sought to
redefine the working relationship between private business and the government by
proposing to manage incarceration facilities in a more cost-effective manner than
facilities operated by the government. The timing of the creation of CCA is notable.
Immediately after former President Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, the start
of a series of strict drug laws began being enacted. As incarceration facilities across the
country rapidly filled, CCA formed as
...a response to a perceived need among states such as Tennessee for
additional space to warehouse criminals in order to comply with court
rulings declaring the conditions of [the state’s] overcrowded prisons
unconstitutional. (Neill & Gable 92)
CCA is now the largest private, for-profit prison operator, a multinational corporation,
and “has an annual revenue of $1.7 billion” (Heitzeg 39). GEO Group (formerly
Wackenhut) is the next largest private, for-profit corrections provider. It has operations
globally, a bed capacity of 87,000, and reported revenues of $1.69 billion in 2014. Both
of these corporations are traded on the New York Stock Exchange and “boast of investors
12

Public-run facilities are those managed by local, state, and federal government agencies and departments.
The facilities are funded using money collected from taxes and other forms of government revenue. Private
facilities are those managed by private firms. Privately-run facilities do not necessarily have to be forprofit; legally, nothing is preventing a private, non-profit entity from managing an incarceration facility.
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such as Chevrolet, Exxon, Ford, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, Texaco, UPS,
Verizon, and Wal-Mart” (Heitzeg 39). GEO Group advertises its real-time stock
exchange figures on the home page of its website. The existence and viability of private,
for-profit incarceration management companies like CCA and GEO Group depend upon
the usage of penal incarceration and also have a business interest in the expansion of
penal incarceration in the United States and globally.
It is not only the participation of commercial enterprises which shape the
understanding of the PIC. Recall that Goldberg and Evans stated that the PIC is “an
interweaving of private business and government interests” (7). Campaign contributions
from incarceration-related businesses,13 the employment opportunities incarceration
facilities provide for a community, the popular appeal of government officials being
perceived as tough on crime, and the claim of a reduction of government spending with
the introduction of private, for-profit facilities14 are some of the government-related
interests of the PIC.
More importantly, some of the aforementioned aspects of “government interests”
lead into the broader idea of social control – the second identified critique of the PIC.

A section of Benjamin R. Inman’s “The Prison Doors Swing Both Ways: Elite Deviance and the
Maintenance and Expansion of the Market of Prison-Industrial Complex” in Volume III of Prison
Privatization: the Many Facets of a Controversial Industry specifically deals with campaign contributions
by the various sectors of business with interests in the criminal justice and penal incarceration systems.
14
Neill and Gable explain that the cost-benefit/cost-savings argument used by supporters of private, forprofit incarceration facilities follows a typical line of reasoning: “full government control of prison
operations leads to waste and inefficiency and…the private sector, free from procedural constraints and
spurred by competition, can provide better outputs at a lower cost than the public sector” (94). However,
there are complications with even making such comparisons between publicly and privately run facilities.
Neill and Gable point out that the private facility cost-saving “rhetoric…has continued despite the
difficulties of making adequate comparisons between public and private facilities and despite evidence
suggesting that contracting out for the management of corrections does not save taxpayers money and can
lead to even worse prison conditions for inmates” (94). In “Comparing Public and Private Prisons: The
Trade-offs of Privatization,” Benjamin R. Inman discusses the complications with determining whether
privately run incarceration facilities in fact save the government and tax-payers money.
13
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Social control is “the means by which collectives secure adherence to ideational and
behavioral norms and curtail disruptive deviance” (Soss et. al 536).15 Proponents of the
PIC argue that marginalized populations – economic, racial, religious, ethnic,
gender/queer, political – are systematically incarcerated or surveilled since they are likely
to be perceived as challenging the established, hegemonic order. Terance D. Miethe and
Hung Lu in Punishment: A Comparative Historical Perspective note:
civil and criminal laws have been widely used over time and across
different countries to disrupt, harass, imprison, and/or eliminate particular
individuals and social groups that represent a threat to the prevailing
authorities. (200-1)
Again, critics of the PIC reject the reason for the global growth of the various means of
imprisonment as a response to increased criminal activity threatening public safety.16
The incarceration of revolutionaries and political dissenters, non-gender conforming
peoples, racially, ethnically, economically, and/or religiously marginalized peoples is not
due the fact that these people are essentially more dangerous or transgress more laws
within a given society than people who are not marked in these ways; it is because these
people are perceived as threatening.
Davis is one among many critics of the PIC who points to the United States to
highlight how social control of marginalized populations operate. At around two and a
half million, the United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world – though
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Ideational and behavior norms are not necessarily benevolent, equitable, or just. Racial, chattel slavery
was at one point a norm in the United States. Deviance to this norm would include insurrections, escapes,
and covert networks like the Underground Railroad.
16
Statistics in the United States have shown that “the population behind bars has kept on growing even as
overall crime rate dropped precipitously for some fifteen years” (Wacquant 84).
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countries like China and India have far more people. Adding the people who are under
surveillance of some kind (e.g. parole, probation, and house arrest with electronic
monitoring), the total is around seven million. “This is roughly one out of every thirtytwo adults in the United States” (Neill & Gable 93). These adults (and children charged
as adults) are disproportionately part of the economic underclass and particularly are
people of color.17 Bryon E. Price and Richard Schwester in their article, “Economic
Development Subsidies and the Funding of Private Prisons,” contend this occurs
“because minorities are thought to ‘threaten the existing distribution of economic rewards
and political power’” (111). Heitzeg explains, “Despite no statistical difference in rates
of offending, the poor, the undereducated, and people of color, particularly African
Americans, are overrepresented in these statistics at every phase of the criminal justice
system” including the juvenile criminal justice system (46).18

ii.a.2. Dehumanization
For Davis, the PIC is an indefensible mechanism of violence and brutality, and
more specifically, it is a mechanism which dehumanizes. Dehumanization is an act or
acts which uncouples the humane consideration and treatment from a human being.
David Livingstone Smith in “Dehumanization, Essentialism, and Moral Psychology”
describes dehumanization as having and continuing to play “a significant role in
facilitating and motivating episodes of genocide, war, slavery, and other forms of mass
In The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander finds: “One in three young African American men will serve
time in prison if current trends continue, and in some cities more than half of all young adult black men are
currently under correctional control—in prison or jail, on probation or parole” (9).
18
Heitzeg uses the case of drug offenses to support this claim: “African Americans, who are thirteen
percent of the population and fourteen percent of drug users, represent thirty-seven percent of the people
arrested for drug offences and fifty-six percent of the people in state prisons for drug offences” (46).
17
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violence” (815). Looking at the practice of racial, chattel slavery in the United States
helps to underscore what dehumanization means for Davis. A “slave is transmogrified
from human subject into a physical object…reduced to moveable form of property known
as ‘chattel’” (Best 25). Slave abolitionists “viewed the institution of slavery as inherently
evil, corrupt, and dehumanizing, such that no [slave] in bondage – however well-treated
by their ‘masters’ – could attain full dignity, intelligence, and creativity of their humanity”
(Best 25).
Davis claims the PIC dehumanizes on multiple levels. Within the walls of
incarceration facilities, mental and physical brutalities are integral parts of the
environment. Inmates often describe the existence in an incarceration facility in terms of
survival. Shaka Senghor spent nineteen years in prison and seven of those in solitary
confinement. In his memoir, Writing My Wrongs: Life, Death, and Redemption in an
American Prison, he states: “For the lowest of the inmates to the highest reaches of the
prison staff, life in jail was a real-life human experiment of survival of the fittest” (28).
One does not live in an incarceration facility; one tries merely to survive incarceration.
Practices like solitary confinement, death row and the death penalty, sexual abuse,
frequency of physical assaults and deaths among prisoners and officials, and medical
neglect replace “living” with “survival.”
Davis believes dehumanization is an intrinsic aspect in the ideological
components which define the PIC. She is a staunch anti-capitalist and considers
capitalism to be inherently repressive and exploitive. In the course of being concerned
with profit, capitalism “produc[es] the means to main and kill human beings and devour
social resources” (AD 39). As previously discussed, the profit-motivated aspect of the
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PIC shifts the interest from retribution and rehabilitation to economic viability. Market
centrality allows for and encourages investment in architecture, technologies, and the
proliferations of commodities prison populations consume and produce (AD 114). In this
way, the practice of penal incarceration is viewed as an opportunity to make investors
and companies more profitable, and inmates are considered non-human or objects – as
was the case with racial, chattel slavery. People are seen as a means to an end with no
regard for their physical, psychological, and social livelihoods.
Furthermore, as Smith rightly points out, if certain behaviors or actions are
objected to on the basis that they dehumanize, there is simultaneously an implicit or
explicit claim about what it means to be human (819). Davis does link the
dehumanization of PIC to the erosion of “democratic rights and liberties” (AD 122). In a
sense, one who is not dehumanized is one whose democratic rights and liberties have not
been eroded on Davis’s account. Obviously, the function of incarceration is to restrict
certain liberties as a means of punishment. Davis is not only referring to the act of
incarceration but also to something much deeper than not being able to decide when or
what one eats for instance. Instead, she believes prisons “constitute extreme sites where
democracy has lost its claims” (AD 124).
There are certain features which characterize what democracy means. These
features may change depending upon the context in which democracy is defined or what
type of qualifier accompanies the word democracy (e.g. liberal democracy, direct
democracy, etc.). A dominant, democratic, feature of the present-day United States is an
adult citizen’s right to vote. One reason Davis believes incarceration facilities are
“extreme sites” where democracy no longer operates is because they are sites of
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temporary and/or permanent disenfranchisement. Not only are incarceration facilities
actually the place where people are denied this democratic feature of voting,19 but this
denial can be extended after people are released. Those on parole or probation are denied
the right to vote in a number of states, and some are permanently disenfranchised. In
other words, once someone has “served their time” or repaid their “debt to society,” the
punishment continues. With the denial of the right and duty to vote, voting
disenfranchisement is an explicit means for silencing and disappearing someone.
Disappearance (physical and social) is a manner in which social control operates via the
PIC. In a representational government, the ability to vote is the ability to be heard and
recognized.
Formerly incarcerated individuals are continually stigmatized after their release
in other ways. Social mobility is stifled not only through the problems surrounding
unemployment post-release but also through laws that deny education loans to those
convicted of certain felonies, and the “federal law forbid[ding] ‘veterans’ benefits,
welfare payments, food stamps and disability support to anyone who is an inmate for
more than 60 days” (Mendieta 306). All these taken together support Davis’s claim that
incarceration facilities represent “state-sponsored terrorism against its citizens” (AD 67).
The punishment that follows a formerly incarcerated individual is a type of violence that
removes “citizens from the cycle of the production of social wealth, and contribute to
their prolonged exclusion from such a cycle” (Mendieta 306). This is why in Are Prisons
Obsolete? Davis speaks of the permanent social banishment of inmates and the formerly
incarcerated.
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Currently, only Maine and Vermont allow inmates to vote by absentee ballot.
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ii.b. Abolition
What then would it mean to be a prison abolitionist given Davis’s understanding
of prison to mean the PIC? It means the abolition of broader ideological, economic, and
behavioral systems. “The abolition of prisons is the abolition of the instruments of war,
the abolition of racism, and, of course, the abolition of the social circumstances” that
contribute to populating the prisons in the first place (AD 74).
Davis’s use of the term abolition is meant to invoke pre-Civil War and Civil War
era slave abolition movements. Davis reminds us that those subject to imprisonment are
specifically excluded from the Thirteenth Amendment, which declares: “Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted shall exist within the United States, or any other place subject to
their jurisdiction” (U.S. Const. amend. XIII, sec. 1). This is a crucial point for Davis in
demonstrating the function of the term abolition in the context of prison abolition.
This late twentieth-century “abolitionism,” with its nineteenth century
resonances, may also lead to a historical recontextualization of the practice
of imprisonment. With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, slavery
was abolished for all except convicts – and in a sense the exclusion from
citizenship accompanied by the slave system has persisted within the US
prison system. (RC 72)
The Thirteenth Amendment permits slavery and involuntary servitude for those convicted
of a crime; thus, the practice of slavery was never entirely abolished with the passage of
the Thirteenth Amendment. Brewer and Heitzeg note that this “loophole” had “allowed
for the conversion of the old plantations to penitentiaries” (632). Prison abolitionists are
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continuing the same struggle as slave abolitionists – the struggle to end the practice of
slavery in the United States. Moreover, prison abolitionists are insistent that white
supremacy (and anti-black racism) was reinforced and codified in law – despite the
Thirteenth Amendment. “The abolition of slavery did not result in the abolition of the
essentialist racism in the law; it merely called for new methods of legally upholding the
property interests of Whiteness” (Brewer & Heitzeg 631).
The connection, however, between slavery and criminal incarceration in
American history existed well before the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and
extends back to the colonial period. Matthew T. King details: “In 1697, England
introduced prison labor in the form of transportation to North America” (13).
Transportation, in this context, refers to the process of sending individuals found guilty of
a crime from England to North America for hard labor as indentured servants or
permanent slaves. Prior to the practice of transportation being a formal law, “[c]onvicted
felons could petition for a pardon on the condition that they agreed to be transported to an
American colony for slave labor” (King 13). After transportation became a “formal law”
with the Transportation Act of 1718, judges were able to “sentence offenders to
transportation and avoid the process of allowing pardons in lieu of sentencing” (King 13).
After the Revolutionary War, transportation waned and eventually ceased.
However, the connection between forced labor and criminal punishment continued in the
penitentiary system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The comparisons between
the practice of incarceration and the practice of slavery were drawn by both advocates
and proponents of the use of penitentiaries. Adam Jay Hirsch in The Rise of the
Penitentiary: Prisons and Punishment in Early America says, “A number of
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publicists…explicitly termed their proposals for workhouses and hard labor by criminals
as ‘slavery’ programs, and some advocates continued to describe inmates as slaves after
penitentiaries went up” (74).20 Davis notes that “some antislavery advocates spoke out
against the new system of punishment during the revolutionary period” (APO 26-7).
However, the shift from public corporal/capital punishment as the principle form of
punishment to the penitentiary system – when incarceration became the punishment itself
– “was generally viewed as a progressive reform” (APO 27).
Hirsch demonstrates well before the Civil War and the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment that “[a]mong the institutions that hovered about the penitentiary” slavery
was the “one that stood out” in the discussion and writings from that period (71). Some
formal similarities exist between the pre-Civil War penitentiary system and racial, chattel
slavery. As Hirsch notes:
Both institutions reduced their subjects to dependence on others for the
supply of basic human services such as food and shelter. Both isolated
their subjects from the general population by confining them to a fixed
habitat. And both frequently coerced their subjects to work, often for
longer hours and for less compensation than free laborers. (71)
Inmates in pre-Civil War penitentiaries were subject to threats and endured physical
violence and death as a form of discipline analogous to the experience of many slaves.
The Slave Codes in the South “authoriz[ed] corporeal chastisement of slaves to the point
of death” not to mention the torture, rape, murder, severing of familial ties executed with

Hirsch also documents inmates’ own sentiments from this period that were “quick to draw such
comparisons” (74).
20
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impunity by slave owners (Hirsch 73). Rules within the penitentiary “prescribing
corporal punishments that had disappeared outside the prison walls mirrored these [slave]
codes” (Hirsch 73). Hirsch catalogs other formal similarities of the two institutions
including a shared nomenclature. For instance, the “‘overseer’ sided in the penitentiary
as well as the plantation, and he supervised the performance of ‘hard labor’” (Hirsch 72).
Inmates and slaves used violent and non-violent means to “escape.” Prison officials and
slave owners “expressed intense, even paranoid, fear of insurrection” (Hirsch 72). Both
systems relied on marking people (uniforms and skin color) in order to distinguish people
from the free population.
These formal similarities existed between the two institutions well before the end
of the Civil War, and most penitentiaries during this time were located outside of the
states which formed the Confederacy – where racial, chattel slavery was most prominent.
In the Northern and deep Southern states prior to the end of the Civil War, penitentiaries
were mainly populated with marginalized immigrant (referred to as “foreign-born”)
peoples.21 Southern states that were closer to the free states did have a disproportional
representation of freed black people in their penitentiaries.
The rise of the black prison population – and prisons more generally – happened
after the Civil War and was concentrated in the former states of the Confederacy. Davis
aligns her view of the modern U.S. prison system, as it has developed post-Civil War,
with W.E.B. DuBois, who saw the rise of criminalization and incarceration of black
people as a continuation of racial slavery. After the Civil War:

People of these “foreign born” communities were racialized – considered racial “others” through
associations with essential characteristics – and the racialization operated on ethnic, linguistic, religious,
and physical grounds.
21
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White legislators mandated a series of laws22 that forced black freed men
to become indentured servants by criminalizing them…Once in prison,
convicts were leased or rented for absurd fees to the private entrepreneurs.
(AD 9)
Holding DuBois’s account to be accurate, Davis claims that prisons are “the persistence
of some of the deep structures of slavery” – such as access to cheap, forced labor and
institutionalized violence – and a non-racist U.S. prison system is an oxymoron (AD 96).
Though Davis focuses on the connection between racial slavery and the modern
prison system in the United States, if one looks at the operation of penitentiaries, prior to
the Civil War, connections between criminal incarceration and slavery are more complex
than the present-day, disproportionate representation of people of color in the criminal
justice system. Since Davis recognizes that our contemporary situation is different from
that of the antebellum era, she expands the notion of race and harms of racialization so as
to move beyond a black/white dichotomy. She explains:
Although the hegemonic struggle against racism has definitely been a
contestation with anti-black racism, through the history of this country,
there have been other racialized histories and other forms of assault on
indigenous populations. I think it is extremely important to acknowledge
the mutability of race and the alterability of the structures of racism. (AD
56)
The “mutability of race” allows Davis to demonstrate that anyone can suffer at the hands
of a racist construct like the PIC or slavery. It permits her to show how “the workings of
22

These laws were known as Black Codes.
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contemporary structured racism…can injure white people as well as people of color” in
terms of incarceration and the death penalty (AD 35). Any person who is part of the
economic underclass has a higher likelihood to get caught in the system.

iii. Imagination and prison abolition
The limitation of human imagination, according to Davis, can be seen in historical
and contemporary behaviors, discourses, and institutions of society. Davis critiques the
human imagination but also claims that the imagination is the impetus for opening up the
possibility for an alternative way of living that would not include the PIC.
Davis offers historic examples of how this imaginative limitation has shown itself
in racial slavery, the abolitionist movement, and in the civil rights movement. In terms of
racial slavery, the limitation of human imagination created the conditions for chattel
slavery. The reduction of human beings to “raced” peoples, the erasure of people’s
autonomy and dignity, and the understanding of human life as commodity were caused
by and sustained through the limitation of the human imagination. As for the abolitionist
movement, in Davis’s “Introduction to the City Lights Edition of Narrative of the Life of
Fredrick Douglass, An American Slave,” she begins with the doubt white abolitionists
had regarding Frederick Douglass’s status as a former slave. She explains that “white
audiences were often so impressed by his literacy and eloquence as a speaker that they
assumed he must have been a free black person who was formally educated” (ICL 21).
They could not imagine the case could be otherwise. On the issue of the civil rights
movement, in a talk given in 2008, Davis spoke of present-day people’s collective
cognitive reduction of the U.S. civil rights movement to Martin Luther King, Jr. She says
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that those in the United States “can’t imagine that movement could have been created by
a huge number of people whose names we do not even know” (Ruggiero 14-5). For
instance, the Montgomery bus boycott “would not have been possible had it not been for
black women domestic workers,” and “we can’t imagine that they were agents of history
that gave us this amazing civil rights movement” (Ruggiero 15).
Davis’s criticism of the imagination are not only external; that is, she is not only
critical of other individual and collective usages of the imagination. Davis also criticizes
her own thinking and analysis and admits to being embarrassed that her early lectures in
the late 1960’s and early 1970’s on Fredrick Douglass “relied on an implicitly
masculinist notion of freedom” (ICL 28). Through a combination of the social norms and
collective consciousness of the era and her own personal imaginative limitations, she
failed to be more critical of the gendering of the material and her presentation of it.
As Davis identifies the imagination as the device for the implementation and
continuation of uncritical ideas and language as well as acts of dehumanization, she also
believes the imagination is the impetus for developing the possibility to transcend
limitations; it can open paths to alternative ways of being in the world. After Davis
admits to her own imaginative limitation regarding Douglass, as noted above, she then
offers a way to engage with this limitation in order to create new possibilities of
interpretation and understanding. In terms of Douglass’s own masculine narrative of
“freedom” and “manhood” and his Narrative’s “abundance of images of enslaved,
thrashed, and battered black women,” Davis believes critics should not want to exorcise
these images – a popular contemporary approach (ICL 34-5). Instead, “we should try to
develop a framework that foregrounds both the complexities of gendered violence under
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slavery and possible gendered strategies for freedom” (ICL 35). As is clear, the limited
imagination contributed to the era which Douglass lived and his own masculine-centric
ideologies, but this limitation becomes the place of creation and possibility for Davis.
Why not try and imagine a framework that is able to sustain multiple realities at the same
time? Why not complicate our interpretation of the Narrative itself, slavery, and our own
notions of gender and violence?
The imagination plays this type of crucial role in prison abolition. For Davis, it is
the limitation of the imagination preventing people from taking serious the notion of
prison abolition. One of the first questions which arise in the discussion of abolishing the
prisons and jails is “what will replace them?” (APO 105). Instead of answering with a
determinate alternative, Davis counters with a question: “Why should it be so difficult to
imagine alternatives to our current system of incarceration?” (APO 105). Those who
oppose prison abolition, or are hesitant in giving it meaningful consideration, want an
answer to the what: what will stand in the prison’s place? This question indicates a
problem for Davis. Davis says “if we focus myopically on the existing system…it is very
hard to imagine a structurally similar system capable of handling such a vast population
of lawbreakers” (APO 106).
The question, “What will replace the prisons?” indicates that one is already
beginning from a non-imaginative orientation. It demonstrates an inability to radically
re-conceptualize accepted ideas about criminal behavior and punishment. Davis claims,
then, a need to revise existing conceptual prisms and reframe how it is we think about
and organize our social and personal worlds. For example, it is our limited way of
defining the prison system which contributes to our lack of ideas and solutions regarding
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this problem. Davis believes that if we expand what the prison system entails then we
would put ourselves in a better position to imagine radical alternatives – not replacements.
“If…we shift our attention from the prison, perceived as an isolated institution, to the set
of relationships that comprise the prison industrial complex, it may be easier to think
about alternatives” (APO 106). Rather than limiting the scope of what “prison system”
means and proposing a one-to-one ratio solution – i.e. replacing the prison system with
some other system which punitively deals with “criminals” – for Davis,
the first step…[is] to let go of the desire to discover one single alternative
system of punishment that would occupy the same footprint as the prison
system…An abolitionist approach…would require us to imagine a
constellation of alternative strategies and institutions, with the ultimate
aim of removing the prison from the social and ideological landscapes of
our society. (APO 106, 107)
Instead of taking on too much, Davis believes “a more complicated framework may yield
more options than if [people] simply attempt to discover a single substitute for the prison
system” (APO 106). She truly does complicate the framework – speaking of economic
exploitation in global capitalism and universal forms of racism, state-sponsored murder,
sexual violence, religious intolerance, homophobia, military and media industrial
complexes, and disappearing communities physically and socially through voting,
employment and educational disenfranchisement (AD 57).
Though Davis offers a negative critique of the institutions and ideologies which
comprise the PIC, she follows in the footsteps of DuBois and believes a positive aspect or
structure with a radically different intent must be proposed as well. “When a system is
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abolished there is a danger that other systems with the same goals would arise to fill the
void left by the abolished system” (Ben-Moshe 85). In terms of U.S. slavery, Du Bois
believed that “abolition [is] not…a mere negative process, one of tearing down. It is
ultimately about creating new institutions” (Ben-Moshe 85). “New institutions” in this
sense would not be replacements having the said function of confinement.
Just as Davis identified the imagination as the problem and solution regarding
the broader ideologies and practices of oppression and brutality, she uses imagination as a
casual variable when speaking of the PIC. The lack of imagination has made
incarceration facilities permanent fixtures of society, but human imagination opens up the
possibility of an alternative way of living which does not need to involve incarceration
facilities or the institutional and ideological structures that have created and sustained
their use. In “Race and Criminalization: Black Americans and the Punishment Industry,”
Davis explains:
Raising the possibility of abolishing jails and prisons as the
institutionalized and normalized means of addressing social problems in
an era of migrating corporations, unemployment and homelessness, and
collapsing public services, from health care to education, can hopefully
help to interrupt the current law-and-order discourse that has such a grip
on the collective imagination, facilitated as it is by deep and hidden
influences of racism. (RC 72)
The imagination allows for the conceptual expansion from the prison system to the PIC
and also allows us to unhinge incarceration facilities from inevitability.
One area, which Davis is admittedly apprehensive, is the development of “an
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academic field that goes by the name of critical prison studies” (CR 431). Davis’s
“ambivalen[ce] about the formation of prison studies as a field” is due to what it could
“mean to constitute a field that foresees and, indeed, strives for its own abolition along
with the abolition of its defining object?” (CR 431). Despite Davis’s concerns over the
formation of an academic field of prison studies, the creation of the academic field at the
very least indicates a growing critical interest into a deeper engagement with the PIC.
In terms of prison abolition, speaking of Eric A. Stanley – the coeditor of Captive
Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex – Davis explains that
“[h]e and other authors write about the important role that transgender politics can play in
furthering prison abolition and, vise-versa, how prison abolition can further the cause of
eliminating transphobia” (CR 430). As more people begin to take the notion of prison
abolition seriously, more and more creative analyses and poetic/experimental approaches
will be developed. Regarding the writings about transgender politics and prison abolition,
Davis says, “Twenty years ago, it would have been impossible to imagine such an
approach” (CR 430). Now such an approach has become possible because the human
imagination went beyond the cognitive limitations which closed off certain possibilities.

iv. Abolition democracy: positive aspect of prison abolition
For Davis, contemporary United States is a capitalist democracy. It is not only
… fundamentally distorted by the market and by the industrial/commercial
system but…it is also racist, patriarchal and, an associated
characteristic, arbitrarily violent, a combination in which each infects and
drives the others. (Catterall 250)
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Davis’s prison abolitionism seeks to untangle the notions of capitalism and democracy
from each other. Ultimately, Davis finds value in democracy as a way for organizing
society, but instead of a capitalist democracy, Davis argues for an abolition democracy.
An abolition democracy is as close to egalitarian as possible. And here, again, we
see Davis returning to DuBois. He used the term “abolition democracy” in Black
Reconstruction to refer to the “host of democratic institutions…needed to fully achieve
abolition” (AD 96). For DuBois, the legal abolition of slavery in the United States was
accomplished only in the negative sense. Though certain practices of racial, chattel
slavery were rendered illegal, the exploitation of black people and the practices which
kept a disproportionate number of black people from economic independence and social
mobility continued. According to DuBois:
New institutions should have been created to incorporate black people into
the social order…[S]lavery could not be truly abolished until people were
provided with the economic means for their subsistence. (AD 95)
Davis uses this formulation when thinking about prison abolition. She says that “new
institutions and resources [must be] made available to those communities that provide, in
large part, the human beings that make up the prison population” (AD 97). Instead of
simply freeing all incarcerated peoples as a means for abolishing prisons, Davis argues
that more individual and community resources are needed in order to stop the supply of
people who populate the prisons. Clearly, thinking about prison abolition in these terms
means it is not a matter of “wielding axes and literally hacking at prison walls” (AD 76).
Thus, Davis believes that people thinking poetically about the supposed necessity of
prisons will be able to “propose the creation of an array of social institutions that would
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begin to solve the social problems that set people on the track to prison thereby helping to
render the prison obsolete” (AD 96). The proposal of and struggle for implementing such
a sweeping set of social institutions would indicate the transformation from a capitalist
democracy to an abolition democracy.
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CHAPTER 3. GIORGIO AGAMBEN AND THE COMING COMMUNITY

i. Introduction
In order to understand the complexities and implications of Giorgio Agamben’s
The Coming Community,23 and eventually how it advances Davis’s prison abolitionism, it
is important to note the conversation Agamben is entering in this book. Leland de la
Durantaye in Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction explains that one dominant
discussion Agamben engages is the “communal conceptions and experiences of Georges
Bataille”24 which, prior to the publication of The Coming Community, Jean-Luc Nancy
and Maurice Blanchot were debating (157). 25 “It is against the backdrop formed by this
debate that Agamben published his less despondently titled The Coming Community” (de
la Durantaye 159). The specifics of the Nancy and Blanchot debate about Bataille far
exceed the project at hand, but generally speaking, these thinkers (Agamben included) are
attempting to think through the issues of belonging – of inclusion and exclusion – that
arise in philosophic investigations of community. As de la Durantaye summarizes:
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Original Italian edition published in 1990; English edition was published in 1993.
In Georges Bataille: The Sacred and Society, William Pawlett describes Bataille as seeking “a powerful
sense of community, one that could not be reduced to notions of culture, identity or ‘thingness,’” and the
“recognition of the radical ‘insufficiency’ of the individual is the vital condition for intense communication
between beings that would build the spirit of community” (xix).
25
These publications include: Jean-Luc Nancy’s article “The Inoperative Community” (1983), Maurice
Blanchot’s book The Unavowable Community (1983), and Nancy’s book The Inoperative Community
(1986).
24
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communities have always had criteria for belonging and have always
organized themselves around these criteria – whether national,
geographical, racial, religious, or other. Even when the conditions of
belonging have been liberally formulated and flexibly interpreted, the
result has nonetheless routinely involved exclusion and isolation, and
sooner or later the purity of identity and the protection of real or symbolic
resources has become a subject of violent contention. (159)
The problem is: the method utilized most often for undermining the “violent contention”
caused by the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy is to redefine the criteria for inclusion. This
approach, however, does not eradicate the “violent contention;” that is, the revision of
who counts as included does not simultaneously eliminate exclusion altogether. Though
such a process is sometimes done under the guise of eliminating the brutalized or
oppressed status excluded individuals or groups experience, the “new” inclusive identity
both values a set of criteria and, whether intentionally or not, vilifies a set criteria which
is defined as not like it. Thus, the predominate means of undermining oppressive realities
experienced by those who are excluded from full access and use of “real or symbolic
resources” – using a different or modified list of characteristics to define the inclusive
group – still dichotomizes people into included/excluded groups, and the process to
overcome the problem begins again.
Agamben attempts to resolve the inclusion/exclusion problem in The Coming
Community by “formulat[ing] an idea of community that would be immune to hostile
takeover…a community without criteria for belonging” (de la Durantaye 159-60).
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Agamben does so by way of re-interpreting the history of (Western) philosophy’s
understanding of ontology via impotentiality.

ii. Foundation: Aristotle and impotentiality
Agamben draws upon Aristotle’s notion of existing/effective potentiality to orient
his ontology of impotentiality, which informs what he means by “a community without
criteria for belonging” (de la Durantaye 160). In the essay, “On Potentiality,”26 Agamben
says, “In both his metaphysics and his physics, Aristotle opposed potentiality to actuality,
dynamis to energeia” (177). But Aristotle also claims there are two modes of potentiality
(dynamis): generic potentiality and existing/effective potentiality (P 179). This means, as
de la Durantaye specifies, “the relation of potentiality to actuality can be articulated in
two modes” (5). Generic potentiality and existing/effective potentiality are distinguished
by Aristotle on the basis of how each potentiality relates to actuality.
Generic potentiality for Aristotle is the “easiest to grasp: the potentiality to be.
For a thing to be, it stands to reason that it must have first been possible (for if it had been
impossible it could never have come to be)” (de la Durantaye 5). According to Aristotle,
generic potentiality operates via possibility; that is, the relation between potentiality and
actuality expressed in the mode of generic potentiality is characterized by possibility, and
possibility is understood through change. In “Capacity and Potentiality: Aristotle’s
Metaphysics Ɵ. 6-7 from the Perspective of De Anima,” Thomas K. Johansen says
change in this sense refers to the “capab[ility] of initiating or undergoing a change” (209).
When Aristotle speaks of change, he has something particular in mind. Change refers to
26

The essay can be found Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy.
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changes in/of attributes (or “ordinary changes” as Johansen calls them); “change involves
the replacement of an attribute by its opposite” (Johansen 213). For instance, light
turning to its opposite dark or big shrinking to its opposite small.
According to Aristotle, generic potentiality is a particular mode of potentiality
that expresses the relation between potentiality and actuality in terms of possibility.
Agamben cites Aristotle’s example: “a child can potentially become the head of State” (P
179). The child can possibly become the head of State. The change here is the
transformation of a child into a head of State. As Tyson E. Lewis explains: “a generic
conceptualization of potentiality explains how a child is able to grow up to be a particular
type of person with a particular occupation” (587). This mode of potentiality depends
upon “fully actual[izing] this potential” (Lewis 588). That is, it can be said that the child
has the potential to become head of State when the child actualizes/realizes this potential.
We know the child had the potential to become the head of State because that is in fact
what the child became. Therefore, generic potentiality is completely determined by
actuality.
In this schema, potentiality…becomes subordinate to actuality – it is in
some sense what makes the actual possible but also what must be
eliminated in order for the passage to the act to be complete and thus for
the subject to rightfully take his or her place within the allotted order of
things. (Lewis 588)
Generic potentiality is fully realized, or known, only after the fact of actualization when
potentiality has already converted into actuality.
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The other mode of potentiality which Aristotle refers is existing/effective
potentiality. Agamben uses passages in his essay “On Potentiality” from Aristotle’s
Book Theta of Metaphysics to highlight Aristotle’s purpose for distinguishing this
particular mode of potentiality. Jessica Whyte in Catastrophe and Redemption: The
Political Thought of Giorgio Agamben summarizes:
Aristotle suggests that to ensure the independent existence of potentiality,
and prevent it passing immediately into actuality, all potentiality much
also be potentiality not to (adynamia). “What is potential,” Aristotle
writes, “can both be and not be, for the same is potential to be and not to
be.” (C 106)
On Agamben’s account, Aristotle believed that impotentiality (adynamia) – the potential
to not be – belongs to all potentiality (dynamia) and uses this to maintain a mode of
potentiality that is not subordinate to actuality. Existing/effective potentiality has a nonbinding relationship with actuality. “The key figure of potentiality,” Agamben says, is
“the mode of its existence as potentiality” (P 179). Potentiality, as potentiality, exists and
sustains itself through impotentiality. The “‘potentiality to not-be,’ or ‘impotence,’ is not
to be understood as…an actual weakness or incapacity, for the reason that it is not to be
understood in the context of actuality at all” (de la Durantaye 5).
The second mode of potentiality, existing/effective potentiality, can be best
highlighted in terms of knowledge. According to Aristotle, knowledge in general is
“already possessed in potentiality or capacity in virtue of being a human being”
(Johansen 213). Humans can have knowledge or abilities independent of whether they
are actualized. Agamben, in concert with Aristotle, uses the examples of the architect
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and poet to show what is meant by existing/effective potentiality. He says, “someone
[already]… has knowledge or an ability” – the architect “has the potential to build” and
the poet “the potential to write poems” (P 179). Existing/effective potentiality is
potential “on the basis of which [one] can also not bring [one’s] knowledge into actuality
(mē energein) by not making a work, for example” (P 179). In The Coming Community,
Agamben uses Herman Melville’s character Bartleby as an exemplar figure in this regard.
“Bartleby [is] a scribe who does not simply cease writing but ‘prefers not to’” (CC 37).
Bartleby has (possesses) the potential to write but chooses not to actualize this potential.
Existing/effective potentiality “is not…the potential to do this or that thing, but potential
to not-do, potential not to pass into actuality” (P 180).
Though there is an absence of actualizing the potential knowledge and/or ability,
existing/effective potentiality is not a pure absence. “[P]otentiality is not simply nonBeing, simple privation, but rather the existence of non-Being, the presence of an absence”
(P 179). Since existing/effective potentiality is not subordinate to actuality, it preserves
its own existence as potentiality. Consequently,
[c]ontrary to the traditional idea of potentiality that is annulled in actuality,
here we are confronted with a potentiality that conserves itself and saves
itself in actuality. Here potentiality, so to speak, survives actuality and, in
this way, gives itself to itself. (P 184)
It is impotence or impotentiality – the potential not-to – as it belongs to all potentiality
that allows the mode of existing/effective potentiality to “survive actuality.” Whyte uses
the terms “complete potentiality” and “perfect potentiality” to reference existing/effective
potentiality and states: “Such perfect potentiality remains capable of the act in

40
withdrawing from it, and so ‘maintains itself in relation to the act in the form of its own
suspension’” (C 106). Said another way, de la Durantaye explains that impotentiality
“denotes the possibility for a thing not to pass into existence and thereby remain at the
level of mere – or ‘pure’ – potentiality” (5). Crucial for the following discussion of The
Coming Community is “the view that potentiality must ‘constitutively be the potentiality
not to,’” and this “provides the ontological underpinning” in The Coming Community (C
106).

iii. Coming community
iii.a. Whatever being: overview
Agamben focuses upon the aspect of the to “not-be” contained in Aristotle’s
second mode of potentiality (existing/effective potentiality) as an opening for rethinking
Western discourse about ontology and the history of Western philosophy. In Agamben
and Theology, Colby Dickinson explains:
In essence, and as will determine Agamben’s fundamental rethinking of
Western ontology in its entirety, the ‘division of division’ itself ultimately
indicates that the representations we depend so much upon for the
comprehension of our world are ‘not all’ there is to reality. (90)
According to Agamben, the constant presence of an absence, the impotence, has been
passed over, forgotten, or misunderstood. It is with this impotentiality Agamben is able
to think through the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy of community and the “violent
contention” associated with it. “The binaries (dichotomies) which govern Western
representations…are the central targets which Agamben hopes to dismantle, especially
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their metaphysical foundations” (Dickinson 99). Understanding ontology through
impotentiality renders the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy inoperable for Agamben and
thus the “violent contention” associated with community/community formation
disappears.
An ontology of impotentiality Agamben terms whatever in The Coming
Community. For Agamben, whatever does not carry the tone of indifference it has in
more recent usages. Whatever – the term quodlibet – is not “‘being, it does not matter
which’ but rather ‘being such that it always matters’” (CC 1). Being whatever thus
amounts to a special or exemplary singularity; it always matters. The indifference
accompanying whatever is that of concerned indifference . As Agamben explains:
The Whatever in question here relates to singularity not in its indifference
with respect to a common property (to a concept, for example: being red,
being French, being Muslim), but on in its being such as it is. (CC 1)
Whatever is not singular due to concerned indifference with respect to an identification or
property (actualization). William Watkin in Agamben and Indifference says, “Whateverbeing here is indifference not because difference is suspended but because being as-such
is foregrounded and put in play by indifference” (67). Being whatever is special or
singular because it is what it is. The radical consequence of the concerned indifference of
whatever being in terms of inclusion or belonging is:
such-and-such being is reclaimed from its having this or that property,
which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class (the
reds, the French, the Muslims) – and it is reclaimed not for another class
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nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its beingsuch, for belonging itself. (CC 1-2)
The influence of Aristotle’s distinction between generic potentiality and
existing/effective potentiality is clear. In terms of generic potentiality, potentiality is
apprehended via the possibility of a change of properties. On the other hand, just as
existing/effective potentiality is not subordinate to actuality (actual properties), whatever
being is not subordinate to actual properties.
If potentiality passed immediately into the act, then each act would be
necessary. Humans could therefore be defined by vocation, a fact, a
biology that was our destiny…[H]umans, Agamben argues, are also
capable of our own impotentiality, which ensures that we are capable of
being other that what we are – that we are beings of pure potentiality,
irreducible to biology, identity, or vocation. (C 110)
Being whatever is being as-such. Whatever being indicates an ontology that is pure
belonging – belonging itself – not an ontology based upon belonging to this or that
identity or group. In Agamben and Politics: A Critical Introduction, Segi Prozorov
describes whatever as “a being that appears solely in its existing, subtracted from all its
positive predicates, be they gender, colour, profession, political or sexual preferences”
(77). A thing is what it is such as it is.

iii.b. Whatever being: Irreparable
Agamben ends The Coming Community with an Appendix titled “The Irreparable.”
It starts with a short, three sentence Preface in which Agamben explains that the previous
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chapters or “fragments” can be understood “as a commentary on section 9 of Martin
Heidegger’s Being and Time and proposition 6.44 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”
(CC 89). Section 9 of Being and Time addresses the who-ness of Dasein27 as
differentiated from a present-at-hand what-ness. 6.44 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus reads:
Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondem dass sie ist [Not how the world is, is the
mystical, but that it is.] According to Agamben, “[b]oth texts deal with the attempt to
define an old problem of metaphysics: the relationship between essence and existence,
between quid est and quod est” (CC 89). In other words, The Coming Community is a
meditation on the relationship between essence and existence, and hence, the
“fragments…will be clear only if one can situate them in this context” (CC 89). It is only
after the reader has read the previous chapters, or fragments, that we are given the
inspiration or context with which to understand The Coming Community.
The Heidegger and Wittgenstein references both address the sheer facticity of
Being. Heidegger in Being and Time attempted to ground Dasein ontologically. Dasein
is a being for who Being is an issue. Dasein is an agent that can interrogate what Being
means and therefore, for Heidegger, has access to the disclosure of Being itself; Dasein
can move beyond conflating Being with a being. Similarly, Wittgenstein, in the passage
noted by Agamben, is commenting that it is not how beings exist but that there is existing
at all which is “mystical.”
Like Heidegger, Agamben believes that the history of Western philosophy has
dealt with the question of Being as if it were a being. In Being and Time, Heidegger says,
“The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity” (BT 26, H 6). For Heidegger, the question
27

Defined below.
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of the meaning of Being requires a methodology – phenomenological analysis – as a
means of uncovering the meaning of Being. Of course, as indicated by the term
phenomenology, the meaning of Being is uncovered by looking at phenomena, and for
Heidegger, the particular phenomenon he uses for his investigation is Dasein – the being
which can ask the question about the meaning of Being.
Agamben in The Coming Community does not follow the specific trajectory of
Heidegger regarding an investigation of Dasein, but the influence cannot be denied.
“[W]hatever beings” do not discard or destroy their positive predicates,
just as the ecstatic character of the existence of Dasein in Heidegger
consists in “exiting” from itself without “abandoning” itself. (Prozorov 77)
With the concept Irreparable, Agamben is trying to conceptualize whatever being – the
fact that there is as opposed to how beings exist. Heidegger states, “Being lies in the fact
that something is, and in its Being as it is” (BT 26, H 7). The Irreparable means without
remedy or without repair; it is as it is.
The Irreparable is that things are just as they are, in this or that mode,
consigned without remedy to their way of being. States of things are
irreparable, whatever they may be: sad or happy, atrocious or blessed.
How you are, how the world is – this is the Irreparable. (CC 90)
Entities are, I am, and the world is, as Agamben states, irreparable; just as they are.
Agamben sees the Irreparable as a way to destabilizes the “old problem of
metaphysics” – of the relation between essence and existence (CC 89). Whatever being
as Irreparable means Being is not predetermined. Entities do not have to be this or that
but are as they are. If entities had to be this or that, they could be remedied to be as they
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should. Irreparable does not assume a prior-to-existence essence or prescription. At the
same time, the Irreparable is also not an existence – a predicate actuality. As Agamben
asserts:
The Irreparable is neither an essence nor an existence, neither or a
substance nor a quality, neither a possibility nor a necessity. It is not
properly a modality of being, but it is the being that is already given in
modality, that is its modalities. It is not thus, but rather it is its thus. (CC
92)
Being whatever is Irreparable but not in the way something exists (i.e. “a modality of
being”). The Irreparable of Being is always “already given” in modality; it is the is-ness
(or the more action orientated is-ing) of its modalities.

iii.c. Whatever being: Thus
.

In section II of the Appendix, Agamben elucidates the thus mentioned at the end

of section I.
Being thus is not a substance of which thus would express a determination
or a qualification. Being is not a presupposition that is before or after its
qualities. Being that is irreparably thus is its thus; it is only its mode of
being. (The thus is not an essence that determines an existence, but it
finds its essence in its own being-thus, in its being its own determination.)
(CC 93)
Through this obscure passage, Agamben is furthering his discussion about the misguided
discourse found in the history of Western philosophy regarding the essence/existence
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dichotomy. Watkin depicts Agamben’s thus in the following way:
Thus-ness therefore is not an abstract quality that links all species of
being, that is, every being, to a general genus Being, namely, what
possesses quiddity, but is always a specific what-ness, that which saves
particularity and generality from their traditional paradoxical relationship
by the insistence of a disseminating singularity… (96)
Two critical points need to be made here. First, being-thus is not a general what-ness that
all entities share. “Since, in Kant’s famous expression, ‘being is not a real
predicate,’…the subtraction of a being from all real predicates leaves it with nothing but
its being itself, the sheer facticity of its existence” (Prozorov 77). Thus-ness is not the
quality which places all entities in the category (or genus) Being. “[B]eing-thus is not
simply that it is but also that it is something in its singularity” (Watkin 96). Second, the
singularity of the thus is not singular in the sense that it is defined against or in opposition
to all other entities.
Agamben classifies that the term “thus” is an anaphora – a word used as a
substitute for a preceding word or group of words. Therefore, “only through this
preceding term does it [the thus] (which, in itself, has no meaning) identify its proper
referent” (CC 94). The thus in Being-thus operates unconventionally. Since Agamben is
trying to destabilize the “old problem of metaphysics” of the relationship between
essence and existence, Agamben claims that “we have to conceive of an anaphora that no
longer refers back to any meaning or any referent, an absolute thus that does not
presuppose anything, that is completely exposed” (CC 94). Exposure, a showing, is an
important idea for Agamben. Rather than the thus referring to a preceding term, and
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hence a predicate identity, the thus of Being-thus is complete exposure and therefore
abandoned.28 “The general features of any given being are…prominently, though
precariously, on display to the world, ‘exposed,’ as [Agamben] will term it, to every other
being” (Dickinson 101).
I am thus, the world is thus, you are thus; I, world, you, each is “such as it is” (CC
93). In other words, I, you, world are not otherwise. For Agamben, “not otherwise
negates each predicate as a property (on the plane of essence), but takes them up again as
im-proprieties or improprieties (on the plan of existence)” (CC 93-4). Being whatever is
an irreparable singularity for Agamben. “Singularity here can be taken to mean lacking
particularity and yet not being subsumed under another one-identity” (Watkin 68).
Singularity is not a particular identity nor is its being analogous to the being just like
everything else.

iii.d. Whatever being: outside as transitional space
In the chapter “Outside,” Agamben attempts to describe how pure exposure is the
singularity of being Whatever. Rather than an ontology determined by identity – a
belonging to this or that group – whatever singularity is “determined only through its
relation to…the totality of its possibilities” (CC 67). And, according to Agamben, it is
…[t]hrough this relationship, as Kant said, singularity borders all
possibility and thus receives its omnimoda determinatio not from its
participation in a determinate concept or some actual property (being red,
Italian, Communist), but only by means of this bordering (CC 67).
28

“Being-thus is not a substance of which thus would express a determination or a qualification” (CC 93).
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For Agamben, a border is not an absolute, impermeable limit that demarcates an inside
from an outside. It is “a threshold (Grenze), that is, a point of contact with an external
space that remains empty” (CC 67). To be in relation to the totality of possibilities means
whatever singularity is “…the relation to an empty and indeterminate totality” (CC 67).
Being whatever is not being this or that for which all things this are not like that.
Whatever being is Being-thus recalling that thus is anaphora that does not refer back to
any referent. Being whatever is the taking-place of the border but a border which is
exposed to the totality of possibilities.
As Agamben often does, he gives an etymological reading for drawing this
conclusion. “[T]he notion of the ‘outside’ is expressed in many European languages by a
word that means ‘at the door’ (fores in Latin is the door of the house, thyrathen in Greek
literally means ‘at the threshold’” (CC 68). The Latin word fores and Greek word
thyrathen are cognates of the Sanskrit dvār; these words share the same Indo-European
root *dhwer. The napumsaka linga (neuter noun) dvāra means door, gate, passage,
entrance, opening, aperture (of the human body), and medium. The Sanskrit word
reinforces the point that Agamben is making about what outside means. It is not
something independent and removed from the inside. “The outside is not another space,
but rather, it is the passage, the exteriority that gives it access – in a word, it is its face, its
eidos” (CC 68).29
The relation between “outside” and “face” is one which Agamben makes
throughout The Coming Community. The face is another way for Agamben to convey the

Thomas Wall compares Agamben’s use of the “face” with Immanuel Levinas’s central notion of the
“face” in Radical Passivity: Levinas, Blanchot, and Agamben.
29
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idea of bordering’s exteriority – of exposure. The relation between “outside” and “face”
via the threshold or door is explicitly present in the Bhagavad Gītā in the usage of dvār.
Various forms of the word occur in six passages. Three out of these six passages use the
word dvār in context to the human body. The first of these happens in “Book V: The
Yoga of Renunciation” śloka thirteen:
sarvakarmāni manasā
samnyasyāste sukham vaśī |
navadvāre pure dehī
naiva karvan na kārayan ||

Having renounced all actions with the mind,
the embodied one, as ruler, sits
happily in the city of nine gates –
indeed not acting nor causing to act (causing action).30
The form of dvār used here is dvāre, the pumlinga (masculine), saptamī (locative),
ekavacana (singular) form that very basically translates to mean in, on, or at the gate/door.
The term nine (nava) modifies or accompanies the word dvāre. As Winthrop Sargeant
footnotes in his translation of Bhagavad Gītā for this passage: “The ‘city’ is the body.
The ‘nine gates’ are the two eyes, the two ears, the two nostrils, the mouth and the organs
of excretion and generation” (BG 255). Significant for our purposes, is as mentioned, the
connection between “outside” and “face” in Agamben. That which is outside – according

30

My translation
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to Agamben – is not wholly beyond and separate from the inside. Outside is a threshold
or a passageway – never a static space that occurs beyond an absolute limit. Agamben
poetically refers to this border, this threshold, as the face; it is pure exteriority or
exposure – “‘showing’ itself as a singularity” (Dickinson 101).

iii.e. Whatever being: community
Whatever being is not something reducible to empirical/corporeal properties
which generally determine it as a kind (essence) of a thing. Recall in the “Introduction”
to this chapter the discussion about inclusion/exclusion. An attempt to revise the
dynamics of inclusion/exclusion of community is done so via a redefinition or
modification upon the predicate criteria of what constitutes the included and excluded
groups. However, the violent contention accompanying the inclusion/exclusion
dichotomy does not cease but rather continues with this method. For Agamben, what
replaces this traditional means of classification of kinds in relation to properties is not
another property/kind classificatory scheme nor is it nihilism where the thing does not
belong to anything at all. Agamben is trying to render the problem associated with
inclusion/exclusion of community inoperative through proposing an ontology of
whatever being.
Commonly, a perceived community or group exists by virtue of a property or set
of properties which is found among the individual entities that populate the group.
Inclusion depends upon discrimination (i.e. discerning this from that) in two respects: 1)
it presupposes the identification of a discernable property or properties and 2)
identification of entities which either contain or do not contain the discernable property
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or properties. At every step of the way, beginning with language, inclusion depends upon
discrimination and thus exclusion.
Agamben undermines this entire process of continual inclusion/exclusion by
demonstrating the ontology of the coming community is whatever being. This means
belonging itself “not by any condition of belonging (being red, being Italian, being
Communist)” (CC 85). All national, racial, gendered, linguistic, ethnic, class, or political
party predicates are not the impetus for the coming community. At the same time,
Agamben is not proposing the dissolution of predicate criteria. The coming community
is not grounded “by the simple absence of conditions (a negative community, such as that
recently proposed in France by Maurice Blanchot)” (CC 85).
The shift in Agamben regarding identity is not one towards absolute nihilism but
does require a revised understanding and us of individual-community identity. Jessica
Whyte in “‘A New Use of the Self’: Giorgio Agamben on the Coming Community” says
the individual would no longer be “an instance of a particular identity” (2). Therefore,
the coming community implies “a new use of the self…[that] entail[s] the
denaturalization and desacrilization of the self” (Whyte 2). This is another area that nonWestern texts and traditions, including the Bhagavad Gītā, can inform the transformation
of conceptions of individuality and/or self. One example occurs in Book Two, śloka
seventy-one:
vihāya kāmān yaḥ sarvān
pumāṅścarati niḥspṛhaḥ |
nirmano nirahaṁkāraḥ
sa śāntim adhigacchati ||
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The man who abandons all desires
acts free from longing.
Indifferent to “mine-ness,” free from egotism,
he attains peace.31
The passage speaks to the abandoning the sense of I, which is understood through the act
of possession. The term ahaṃkāra is the “cognitive faculty of ego-consciousness” and
comes from the Sāṃkhya tradition (Malinar 78). The function of the ahaṃkāra is
attachment to the sense objects and appropriation of the world by relating
to it through the word ‘I’. As a consequence, it is held that renouncing all
desires means to rid oneself of ‘egotism’ (nirahaṃkāra) and
possessiveness (nirmama). This results in a ‘brahman-like’ condition,
which means that all attachment is gone and an impersonal state of being
has been obtained. (Malinar 78)
Rather than equating identity with predicate criteria (“sense objects”/“appropriation of
the world”), Agamben wants to undermine this sense of self-community. Human
ontology is one of impotentiality; we cannot be attached or dependent upon identity.
Predicate characteristics do not vanish. Whatever beings “retain their predicates, [but]
they are no longer definable through them” (Prozorov 77). Dickenson puts it the
following way: “In effect…‘whatever beings’ hold open the empty place of identity
without yet constituting one as such according to a reductionistic logic of exclusion”
(101).
31
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iv. Identity: Agamben and Davis
One very clear area that Davis and Agamben inform one another is in terms of
identity. Both challenge us to unhinge political and social identities from the notion of
essence. In “Coalition Building among People of Color: A Discussion with Angela Y.
Davis and Elizabeth Martinez,” Davis says “it is more productive…not to adhere to rigid
categories, to the idea that there is something called ‘African-American woman-ness,’
some essence of what constitutes ‘African-American woman’” (304). This sentiment, the
essentializing of identity based upon predicate characteristics is exactly what Agamben is
(in part) challenging in The Coming Community. When such identities are thought of as
being essential, energy is spend defining and making rigid those identities. Instead,
Davis believes it is “important to fight on and not about political terms” (CB 304). Use
the identity – whatever it is – as the ground for which to situate the discussion toward
larger social justice issues.
Davis unequivocally thinks that identity is an ineffective way to organize
communities of struggle.32 In Abolition Democracy, Davis explains:
Identity, by itself, has never been an adequate criterion around which
communities of struggle could be organized – not even during those
periods when we imagined identity as the most powerful engine of
movements…Even during the period when black unity was assumed to be
the sin qua non of struggle, it was more a fiction than anything else. The
class, gender, and sexual fissures that lurked just beneath the construction
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Communities of struggle, resistance, and approaches to political goals (by Davis and Agamben) will be
discussed in further detail in Chapter Fiver.
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of unity eventually exposed there and other heterogeneities that made
‘unity’ an impossible dream. (100-1)
Rather than using identity to be the site around which to build communities of struggle,
Davis proposes the use of political goals. She claims it would be “futile to try and create
a single black community today. But it does make sense to think about organizing
communities, not simply around their blackness, but primarily around political goals”
(AD 101). Agamben proposes we recognize our ontological condition, whatever being –
being as-such, not being this or that. Identity is not erased; predicate characteristics do
not simply disappear. They are no longer essential attributes to categorize and fix our
understanding of ourselves, others, and the world.
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CHAPTER 4. TIME AND LIBERATION

Part I: Temporality
i. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the explicit and implicit temporal
structures of Agamben’s coming community and Davis’s prison abolition. When –
temporally – does prison abolition and the coming community occur? When – at what
time – is liberation achieved, if ever? Moreover, what alterations to our classification and
thinking about time are needed to recognize these liberatory existences?
I will demonstrate that Agamben’s rendering of ontology in terms of
impotentiality and indifference, when put in dialogue with Davis, exposes latent and
unexplored philosophic suggestions Davis is making – specifically that the operation of
liberation is best understood as indefinite rather than finite and attainable. Ultimately, the
poetic re-thinking Agamben applies to ontology, temporality, and its political
consequences serve as examples of the kinds of cognitive re-orientations vital for the
prison abolitionist project: abolishing the conditions which allow for the prison industrial
complex to be an unquestioned, inevitable part of social reality.
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Agamben and Davis first complicate the colloquial discourse and understanding
of time in their outlines of the coming community and prison abolition respectively. Both
confuse the relationship between occurrence and linear temporality, and this posture
ultimately influences the function of determinacy and achievement of liberation. More
specifically, Agamben and Davis speak as if these notions (i.e. coming community and
prison abolition) are not things that will occur in the future but already exist now – in the
present – and extend indefinitely into the future.

ii. Time
Before examining the specifics of how temporality operates in Agamben and
Davis, some opening remarks about time are needed to ground this discussion. The
concept of time is a highly complex and contested notion. Time has a litany of
definitions and associations which vary across disciplines and cultures. How time is
expressed in language via linguistic structures also varies among language groups. For
example, how would English speakers lived experience change if we had no past tense?
The ontological and structural questions of time are fundamental to discussions in
theology, psychology, philosophy, and physics. The normative, everyday concept of time
is generally described as passing. In Time and Space, Barry Dainton explains that “what
we mean when we say that time passes, the following formulation encapsulates the
essentials: What is future will become present; what is present will become past; what is
past was once present” (7). For example, the Haitian slave revolt, from a contemporary
perspective, is an event in the past. During the actual revolt, the event was considered
present, and prior to the event, it was in the future. All events “start off in the future,
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become present and then recede into the past. This process is often called ‘temporal
passage’” (Dainton 7). For our purpose, the following discussion of Agamben and Davis
will describe how each thinker deviates from the normative concept of time as temporal
passage.

iii. Time of liberation
iii.a. Agamben: archaeology/genealogy of Western conceptions of time
Agamben gives a genealogy of the Western conceptions of time in his essay
“Time and History: Critique of the Instant and the Continuum” in Infancy and History:
On the Destruction of Experience. This essay helps explain the implicit critique of time
that the temporal underpinnings of prison abolition addresses but it will also speak to the
importance of temporality in relation to theories of political and social change. Agamben
traces some predominant themes and interpretations of time within the Western cannon,
which has contributed to our modern experience of time. For Agamben, “[s]ince the
human mind has the experience of time but not its representation, it necessarily pictures
time by means of spatial images” (IH 100). It is through these spatial representations that
Agamben is able to locate features of time that characterizes certain dominant ideologies
crucial for understanding how the (Western’s) current experience of time developed via
the Greeks, Christianity, and secularization/modernization.
Agamben claims that the dominant image-concept of time in the Graeco-Roman
period is “basically circular and continuous” (IH 100). Whether with reference to “the
cyclical revolution of the celestial spheres” as in Plato’s Timaeus or “‘human affairs and
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those of all other things that have natural movement’” as in Aristotle, (Western)
Antiquity can be said to see or think of time as a circle (IH 100).
Time may have been spatially represented as circular for the Greeks, but it is not
the case that through the experience of natural change and human events, there was no
sense of a before and after. If time was only and absolutely circular, then the experiences
of beginning, middle, and end, would be unintelligible. Properly speaking, it would be
impossible, according to Aristotle, “to say whether we are before or after the Trojan War”
(IH 101). In order to account for this, Aristotle quantified time. As Agamben explains,
“Aristotle thus defines time as ‘quantity of movement according to the before and after,’
and its continuity is assured by its division into discrete instants…analogous to the
geometric point” (IH 101). The instant, or the now, paradoxically divides and creates
continuity. “The instant in itself is nothing more than the continuity of time…a pure limit
which both joins and divides past and future” (IH 101). With the Greeks, then, the notion
of the now-instant being a now-point which is continually passing is introduced. “[T]he
fundamental character of the Greek experience of time – which, through Aristotle’s
Physics, has for two millennia determined the Western representation of time – is its
being a precise, infinite, quantified continuum” (IH 101). Not only does the Greek
conception of time, according to Agamben, include the notion of these “precise fleeting
instants” but also that “[t]ime is something objective and natural, which envelops things
that are ‘inside’ it as if in a sheath…as each thing inhabits a place, so it inhabits time” (IH
102).
After the Greeks, the next predominant image-concept of time is the Christian
account. According to Agamben, “While the classical representation of time is a circle,
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the image guiding the Christian conceptualization of it is a straight line” (IH 103). The
image of the straight line aligns with the Christian narrative and meaning of human
existence – having a specific start (i.e. God’s creation) and a specific end (i.e. God’s final
judgment). The change from the circle to the straight line demonstrates a change in the
directionality of time.
[I]n contrast with the directionless time of the classical world, [Christian]
time has a direction and a purpose: it develops irreversibly from the
Creation to the end, and has a central point of reference in the incarnation
of Christ, which shapes its development of a progression from the initial
fall to the final redemption. (IH 103)
The Christian worldview posits time as trajectory; it is moving in a linear fashion from
creation to redemption. On this account, the purpose or goal is the final redemption.
Since it is linear, every moment which passes is a moment further from creation and the
fall and closer to redemption; therefore, a sense of progress – or teleology – is introduced.
The Christian conception of time takes the nature-inspired (external) time of the
Greeks and places the experience of time within humans and human history – spiritually
understood. Agamben says that “Christianity resolutely separates time from the natural
movement of the stars to make it an essentially human, interior phenomenon” (IH 104).
Given what humans are considered to be according to Christianity – that is, creations of
God endowed with a divine spark or soul meant to reside with the creator after the death
of the body – it is understandable how time becomes something that does not encompass
natural phenomena and movements but rather is internal to human beings and human
history. One of the consistencies, however, from the conception of time in Antiquity to
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the Christian conception of time is “the continuous succession of precise instants of
Greek thought” (IH 104).33 The present is considered to be an instant or point that
separates that past from the future.
The shift from the Christian representation of time to what Agamben calls the
modern representation of time is small but significant. Whereas the change from
Antiquity to the Christian spatial representation of time was a change from the circle to
the straight line, the modern representation still remains as a straight line (or “rectilinear”)
but is secularized; it is “sundered from an notion of end and emptied of any other
meaning but that of a structured process in terms of before and after” (IH 105). This
experience of time “derives from the experience of manufacturing work and is sanctioned
by modern mechanics” (IH 105). The repetitive motion associated with industrial work –
both the motion of the machines and that of the human workers (i.e. the repetition of
beginning of task to end of task to beginning again ad infinitum) – is not an indication of
“circular motion” for Agamben; it is an indication of “uniform rectilinear motion” (IH
105). Again, the modern notion of time re-establishes Antiquity’s continuous, infinite
notion of time, but rather than picturing it as a circle, it sees it as an endless straight line.
From the prospective of the modern concept of time “a semblance of meaning can be
saved only by introducing the idea – albeit on lacking any rational foundation – of a
continuous, infinite progress” (IH 106). The modern conception of time does hold onto
the sense of progress, which was a defining feature of Agamben’s characterization of the
Christian conception of time. Instead of progress being understood in religious terms of
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Agamben cites Augustine’s Confessions as evidence.
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the final redemption, it is understood in improving technological and quality-of-life
terms.34

iii.b. Temporality and the coming community
Though the purpose of Agamben’s essay – to propose a complementary theory of
temporality to Marx’s historical materialism – will not be explored here, the reasons for
him to propose such a theory will help the understanding of the temporal situatedness of
the coming community: a community whose ontological condition is not determined via
predicate characteristics. At the beginning of “Time and History: Critique of the Instant
and the Continuum,” Agamben says:
…every culture is first and foremost a particular experience of time, and
no new culture is possible without an alteration of this experience. The
original task of a genuine revolution, therefore, is never merely to “change
the world,” but also – and above all – to “change time.” (IH 99)
As the previous chapter demonstrated, Agamben in The Coming Community proposes an
ontology of impotentiality, which would render the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy
inoperable and therefore dissolve the continual “violent contention” associated with this
dualism. The argument of whether Agamben’s proposal was in fact radical (or
revolutionary) can be paused in order to acknowledge his intention in The Coming
Community (and many of his other works) is to usurp and radicalize traditional
philosophic interpretations. It stands to reason, then, that given what Agamben says

In the chapter “Contemporary Challenges to the Idea of History” in Knowledge and Human Liberation:
Towards Planetary Realizations, Ananta Kumar Giri gives a comparative reading of the experience of time
and human history between Indian/Southeast Asian culture and Western culture.
34
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above, altering our experience of time is key for such a revolution. As Watkin says,
“What is at issue is nothing less than a ‘new culture’ and the ‘revolutionary’ politics that
might bring it about” (Watkin 95).35
By virtue of the term alone, coming community would seem to indicate that
Agamben is proposing a community to come – one that is not existent in the present and
will, at some moment in the future, become present. However, (as we see with with
Davis and prison abolition) this assumption is misguided. As Agamben makes clear, the
coming community is not one which will become present in the future. In the essay
“Quodlibet: Giorgio Agamben’s Anti-Utopia” Carlo Salzani explains:
The ‘coming’ of the coming community is devoid of the tension toward
something that lies ahead, in the future, devoid of a linear understanding
of time that sees it as a cumulative progression. (223)
Coming must be disconnected from a linear context or association. It does not mean to
come in the future; it means something closer to “presencing” or “becoming.” The
coming community is present for Agamben here and now. Agamben is giving an
ontological account of a form of “singularity without identity that he terms ‘whatever
being’ and in the…community he terms the ‘coming community’” (C 144). Alex Murry
in his book Giorgio Agamben characterizes the coming community as “always in the
process of coming, [it] is here in the present, yet whose potential hasn’t been grasped”
(51). The parameters for Agamben are about recognition and use not about present nonexistence and future existence.
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Ontology and politics are inextricably linked for Agamben, and this is discussed at the end of this
chapter.
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iii.c. Temporal structure of Davis’s prison abolition
Davis’s use of the term abolition is meant to invoke the slave abolition
movements of Western Europe and the Americas and thus keep at the fore the connection
between prison abolition to liberation.36 Temporality offers one way of distinguishing
between two predominant slave abolitionist tactics: gradualism and immediatism.37
Generally speaking, gradualists saw advantages to a slow and measured transition from
legal, chattel slavery to emancipation.38 Some abolitionists, like William Lloyd Garrison,
grew frustrated with this approach and believed it to be complacent to the brutal system
of chattel slavery. As Steven Best in The Politics of Total Liberation: Revolution for the
Twentieth-Firth Century details, Garrison, “a former indentured white servant, started a
prominent abolitionist newsletter, the Liberator, on January 1, 1831, which he published
for 35 years” (27). As Garrison made clear in the first editorial, “the philosophies of
gradualism” were “complacenc[ies] of reform,” and he “called for the ‘immediate and
complete emancipation of all slaves’” (Best 27). In “William Lloyd Garrison at Two
Hundred: His Radicalism and His Legacy for Our Time,” David Blight explains that
those in agreement with Garrison “converted to immediatism, [which is] the argument
that slaves had the inherent right to their freedom instantly” (5).
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Liberation is addressed in the next section of this chapter in further detail.
There are other ways of distinguishing among the tactics of the slave abolition movements (e.g.
militant/non-militant). David Walker and Henry Highland Garnet were among the “most militant voices
advocate[ing] the use of force as a necessary or legitimate tactic of struggle and self-defense” (Best 26).
38
In the 2nd edition of the Thoughts on civilization, and the gradual abolition of slavery in Africa and the
West Indies (1791), the author is sympathetic to gradualism on the basis that non-European peoples,
“natives” and “Africans” in this case, are barbarous and would be incompatible with living in a civil society
which has the rule of law. Referring to Africans, the author states: “I will show that the reformation of
habits and manners must be gradual, and that the world is not yet ripe enough for its emancipation. I firmly
believe, that a sudden and unqualified abolition of slavery everywhere would in many respects, be
accompanied with evils which would make us wish, for a time, for the return of slavery itself” (3).
37
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Both gradualism and immediatism purported to have the same social and political
goal: to abolish the system of slavery. However, each faction differed with respect to the
temporal notion of duration. For the gradualists, an extended or longer duration between
the present situation at hand (slavery) and the future goal (emancipation) was accepted
and embraced as a tangible, effective approach. On the other hand, immediatists believed
that moderation and incremental steps only prolonged the unjustified misery of enslaved
human beings. Immediatists perceived any extended duration between chattel slavery
and emancipation as unacceptable. For some immediatists, like Garrison, gradualism
became interpreted as merely reforming the system of slavery and not the abolishment of
slavery. As can be seen, the interpretation of the temporal notion of duration of the
gradualists and the immediatists had significant consequences in the discussion and
struggle for abolition. Whether warranted or not, the acceptance and promotion of an
extended duration by the gradualists caused the immediatists to call into question the
gradualists’ stated commitment to slave abolition.
Thinking about the slave abolition movements in terms of duration offers a basis
of comparison for Davis’s prison abolition. Stephan J. Hartnett attempts to distinguish
Davis from the gradualist and immediatist approaches. It is very much the case that
“‘abolition’ in the postmodern sense does not mean what it meant in the antebellum
slavery debates” (Hartnett 511). Hartnett says quite plainly, and accurately, that Davis’s
“‘abolition’…does not mean the immediate…abolition of the prison system” (511). This
is true to the extent that Davis is not advocating for the release of every inmate at this
precise now-instant.
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After this, Hartnett’s comparison and attempt to distinguish Davis’s abolition
temporally from immediatism and gradualism breaks down. He says that Davis’s
abolition means a “long-term radical transformation, its dramatic downsizing, its
eventually being turned into something else” (Hartnett 511). To begin, this description in
no way differs on the basis of duration substantially from gradualism (i.e. “long-term”
and “eventually”). Similar to the criticism of the gradualists by the immediatists – the
gradualists were complacent to the slave system by advocating measured reforms –
prison abolitionists tend to be critical of the focus on prison reform. Davis explains that
the public discourse about prison expansion and prison conditions emphasizes
“generating changes that will produce a better prison system,” and “frameworks that rely
exclusively on reforms help to produce the stultifying idea that nothing lies beyond the
prison” (APO 20). I agree with Hartnett’s motivation to differentiate Davis’s prison
abolition on temporal grounds from the gradual and immediate methodologies of the
slave abolition movement, but this particular description of Davis’s abolition does not do
the work it needs to make clear the difference between Davis’s abolition and gradualism.
Hartnett argues that the “course of action” pursued by Davis and other prison
abolitionists is “in terms that are less immediatist or gradualist than futurist” (511). The
problem with this classification is it confuses the understanding of futurism and
misplaces Davis’s temporal elasticity for a future-only goal. Futurism is most commonly
associated with the artistic movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Anne Simon says, for the Italian futurists like F.T. Marinetti, the “most virulent article in
the Credo of the Futurists is their attack on tradition. They have a horror of all that is old
and known. They reject all antecedent forms” (738). It is clear that Davis’s use of the
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term abolition – which is what Hartnett is trying to situate – is precisely the opposite of
what it means to reject all antecedent forms. Davis revises the usage of abolition, but she
is very clear that it is supposed to invoke former slave abolition movements.
Furthermore, even if Hartnett is not drawing upon the principles of the artistic
movement Futurism, labeling Davis a futurist connotes that prison abolition adopts a
future-only orientation; that is, Hartnett’s classification of Davis’s prison abolition as
futurism assumes there is a rigid distinction between present conditions and future
conditions and with an implicit futural favoritism. This understanding mischaracterizes
Davis and other prison abolitionists. As Eric A. Stanley explains in the “Introduction” to
Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex,
For [prison abolitionists], abolition is not simply a reaction to the [prison
industrial complex] but a political commitment that makes the PIC
impossible. To this end, the time of abolition is both yet to come and
already here. (8)
According to this description, prison abolition is part of present conditions and future
conditions. Stanley further explains,
Abolition is not some distant future but something we create in every
moment when we say no to the traps of empire and yes to nourishing
possibilities dreamed of and practiced by our ancestors and friends. (36)
Prison abolitionists, like Davis, do not hold the occurrence of prison abolition to be
inexistent in the present, and at some point in the future, will be existent. Moreover, to
“nourish possibilities dreamed of and practiced by our ancestors” demonstrates the
connectivity and elasticity or prison abolition’s temporal underpinnings. The past is not
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rejected or dismissed. Time is not constituted by complete or absolute, separable
moments of past, present, and future.39

Part II: Liberation
iv. Liberation
The brief outlines of Davis and Agamben in the previous section (iii. Time of
liberation) describe how each deviate from the normative understanding of time as
temporal passing in a similar manner. To think of Agamben’s coming community as an
occurrence in the future that the present is moving towards would be a fundamental
misconception. The coming community is actively presencing. Similarly, to relegate
prison abolition to the status of being non-existent in the present and as something which
will come to be existent at some future moment in time is to ignore the temporal nuance
of prison abolition; that is, it is already an existent in the here and now and in the future.
The next step is to look more closely at how Davis and Agamben uses of time inform,
influence, and complement each thinker’s conception of liberation.

iv.a. Prison abolition and indefinite liberation
As we have seen, Davis can be differentiated from the slave abolitionist
movements of immediatism and gradualism by undermining the normative conception of
time as temporal passing with which those movements were operating. The temporal
assertions by both slave abolition movements and Davis has further implications

In an interview with Frank Barat, Davis says: “It is essential to resist the depiction of history as the work
of heroic individuals in order for people today to recognize their potential agency as a part of an everexpanding community of struggle” (Q 5).
39
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regarding how liberation functions. The struggle for the abolition of slavery – as well as
revolts, insurrection, and escapes – were struggles for liberation. Slave abolitionists
called for and fought for the emancipation of slaves: the end of the practice of racial,
chattel slavery. This goal was, on these terms, accomplished with the Emancipation
Proclamation and the adopting of the Thirteenth Amendment. The struggle for liberation
was achieved when the legal, racial system of slavery became illegal.
However, Davis claims that prison abolition exists already and in the future, and this
temporal assertion has consequences on the understanding of an abolition democracy: the
political and social organization absent of the PIC. Prison abolitionists, like Davis,
describe the PIC as repressive, violent, exploitive, and dehumanizing. Abolishing the
PIC would therefore have a liberatory effect; it would be the alleviation of the forces
identified as causing or perpetuating a condition considered oppressive and brutal. Davis
specifically addresses the importance of the “creation of communities of struggle,” which
actively opposes the PIC as a means for bringing about communities of liberation (AD
108). The question at hand is what do Davis’s temporal claims about prison abolition (i.e.
the inability for it to be thought of in terms of duration as gradualism and immediatism of
slave abolition) indicate about the struggle and achievement of liberation?
First, prison abolition is already present due to the fact that the conception itself
has already been imagined; it is something that people are actively engaged in creating.
The abolition of the PIC may not be an existential global accomplishment, but the reality
of the idea of prison abolition is very much present. Second, there are processes
underway that currently seem unrelated to prison abolition or criminal justice but are
contributing to the prison abolitionist project. More significantly, in terms of achieving
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or reaching a goal, there never reaches a moment in time when liberation is ultimately or
absolutely achieved in the sense it was for the slave abolition movements. As Davis
explains in an interview on February 25, 2015:
I think the idea that there is a particular point in time where all our dreams
are fulfilled is sort of an anathema to the whole notion of liberation, which
I see as becoming larger and more capacious as we struggle…Why can we
not imagine this happening indefinitely? (ILH)
If the struggle for liberation is indefinite, the achievement of liberation never comes to
full fruition in traditional terms. Davis did gesture at this idea in Abolition Democracy:
“what we manage to do each time we win a victory is not so much to secure some change
once and for all, but rather to create new terrains for struggle” (21). Prison abolition is
thus a continuous becoming and should not be classified or represented in final or
complete terms. Given this interpretation, Davis at the very least obscures the notion of
purpose in regards to prison abolition. There is a lack of purpose in the sense that even if
a prisonless existence, an abolition democracy, is a global reality, the struggle for
liberation continues in currently unimagined ways.
Continuous struggle and the non-achievement of liberation works for Davis given
the object of her critique, those who are to be liberated, and the dual movement (negative
and positive) of abolition. We can again go back to slave abolitionism as a basis for
comparison. The practice of racial, chattel slavery in the United States was a practice of
bondage. Slaves were considered property40 and had no authority over their own bodies,

The 1830 pamphlet “On slavery, and the duty of the religious public with reference to the question of
immediate of gradual abolition,” the author notes that one argument for the continued use of slavery was
40
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their familial ties, their expressions, and their movements. Slave abolitionists often
critiqued other systems or practices which contributed to the desire for such a brutal and
degrading practice – most notably the desire for cheap labor to perform physically
intensive work for the purpose of maximizing profits/wealth.41 However, slave abolition
concentrated on ending the system of racial, chattel slavery.
Davis’s object of critique is much more complex. Davis is not solely, nor even
primarily, focused on the legal use of incarceration facilities as such. Davis is more
concerned with the conditions that allow for incarceration facilities to be considered an
inevitable part of society. Since the abolition of the practice of incarceration does not
map directly onto the abolition of the practice of slavery, the people for whom liberation
is necessary is more expansive. For slave abolitionists, slaves were in need of
emancipation. The liberation at stake is not limited to incarcerated peoples or those
under criminal supervision. For Davis, the imagination of the greater population must
also be liberated in order to abolish the conditions that perpetuate the PIC.
And finally, as discussed in Chapter Two, prison abolition is both a negative and positive
process. Inspired by DuBois who believed that “abolition [is] not…a mere negative
process, one of tearing down. It is ultimately about creating new institutions,” Davis
believes abolition must include creations of social structures and institutions with
radically42 different intent (Ben-Moshe 85). The expansion of the object of critique from

related to this issue of property. “But, say friends of this system, the Slaves are the private property of
individuals; and would [abolitionists] interfere with the sacredness of private property?” (4).
41
The pamphlet “On slavery, and the duty of the religious public with reference to the question of
immediate of gradual abolition” (1830) notes that “slavery is advocated on the plea of necessity – there
were we to abandon the system, we should strike a fatal blow at the prosperity of our West Indian Colonies,
so intimately connected with the commercial interests of the country” (4).
42
This is explained in the next chapter.
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prison to the PIC, those who are to be liberated, and the negative and positive aspect of
abolition compliments the temporal structure of Davis’s prison abolition. Davis is
proposing an existential alteration – a transforming which is always on-going, and the
struggle for liberation is indefinite.

iv.b. Agamben and religious traditions
An issue with looking at Agamben’s coming community in terms of liberation
proper is that, unlike Davis, Agamben rarely uses the term. However, Agamben, taking
aim at the “violent contention” of the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy of community
formation, is implicitly criticizing current paradigms of thinking and modes of human
organization. “Violent contention” is a contingent, mutating force affecting excluded
individuals negatively so rendering that force inoperable can reasonably be interpreted as
a liberating act or having a liberating effect.
Agamben does speak in religiously coded language of salvation, redemption, and
the messianic – forms of religious liberation – throughout his corpus. As we have seen,
the coming community does not operate using the normative conception of time as linear
temporal passing. It causes us to dismantle the idea of the present being prior to salvation
or redemption at some point in the future. Matthew Abbott in The Figure of the World
explains, “redemption for [Agamben] would constitute not some exceptional event of
salvation, but rather a suspension of the dialectic of danger and salvation” (3).43
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Agamben also uses the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989; this is discussed in Chapter Five, which
focuses on forms of resistance.
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iv.b.1: Catholic limbo
“From Limbo,” the second chapter in The Coming Community, Agamben cites the
Catholic notion of limbo as an example where this suspension already occurs; in other
words, limbo offers an example, or paradigm, where the dialectic of condemned/saved is
rendered inoperable. According to Catholicism, everyone is born with the mark (or guilt)
of original sin as a result of Adam’s and Eve’s transgression against God’s
commandment; they ate fruit from a forbidden tree. Francis A. Sullivan, in “The
Development of Doctrine about Infants who Die Unbaptized,” explains, “infants can be
freed from this guilt only through the redeeming grace of Christ, which they would
receive in the sacrament of baptism” (3). Augustine argued that if infants or young
children die before receiving the sacrament of baptism, and the mark of original sin is not
erased, these infants and young children are condemned to hell. The Catholic Church
rejected this Augustinian model. As Sullivan documents,
Pope Innocent III…declared in 1201 that the penalty for original sin is
deprivation of the vision of God, while the torments of hell are suffered by
those guilty of actual sin…and the term ‘limbo’…was adopted as the
name of the state for infants who died unbaptized. (4)
Though limbo is not, nor ever has been, a part of the official teaching of the Catholic
Church, limbo became an exceedingly popular notion as the place for souls of unbaptized
infants and young children.
According to Saint Thomas, “the punishment of unbaptized children who die with
no other fault than original sin cannot be an afflictive punishment, like that of hell, but
only a punishment of privation that consists in the perpetual lack of the vision of God”
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(CC 5). It is precisely the “punishment of privation” which, according to Agamben,
renders the terms of the damned/saved dialectic inoperative. As Agamben explains:
The inhabitants of limbo, in contrast to the damned, do not feel pain from
this lack [of the vision of God]: Since they have only natural and no
supernatural knowledge, which is implanted in us at baptism, they do not
know that they are deprived of the supreme good, or, if they do know (as
others claim) they cannot suffer from it. (CC 5)
The souls in limbo are not suffering; God has not abandoned or forgotten them – like the
damned who suffer with the knowledge they are outside the light of God. Agamben says
that “God has not forgotten them, but rather they have always already forgotten God”
(CC 5-6). Since the souls of limbo were never exposed to the divine in the first place, the
punishment of privation is a joyous experience. “Neither blessed like the elected, nor
hopeless like the damned, they are infused with a joy and with no outlet” (CC 6).
In order to understand how the damned/saved dialectic is suspended altogether in
Agamben’s conception of limbo, we need to recall his discussion about the Irreparable
covered in the Chapter Three. The Irreparable, being-thus, is pure exposure; it is beyond
repair and is as it is. The souls in limbo are irreparable; they are beyond repair.
Salvation is useless because the souls in limbo were never included within the
damned/saved dialectic.
Agamben works from within the Western religious and philosophic tradition and
re-interprets notions, like limbo, to render traditional problems inoperative. In the
discussion of limbo, Agamben is not arguing for or against the theological or rational
existence of limbo. Instead, he took this existent idea and existent writings about limbo
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and exhibits how the concept of limbo suspends the dialectic of unsaved/saved or
condemned/redeemed. If the dialectic is suspended, then the complications associated
with it, or which come from it, (e.g. questions like who is damned, and who is saved?)
dissolve. Agamben is establishing an alternative way of interpreting in order to open up
new possibilities.

iv.b.2: Buddhism and nirvāṇa
Though Agamben’s references to non-Abrahamic religious traditions are sparse in
his corpus, two brief – almost identical – statements occur in The Coming Community.
The first reads: “There is nothing new about the thesis that the Absolute is identical to
this world. It was stated in its extreme form by Indian logicians with the axiom,
‘Between Nirvana and the world there is not the slightest difference’” (CC 53). Then, in
the Appendix, Agamben writes,
This is why Indian logicians said that sicceitas, the being-thus of things,
was nothing but their being deprived of any proper nature, their vacuity,
and that between the world and Nirvana there is not the slightest
difference. (CC 103)
Since Agamben supplies no citation, the identity of the Indian logicians and therefore the
specific school or discipline the logicians were working from remains speculative.
Steven DeCaroli in “The Idea of Awakening: Giorgio Agamben and the Nāgārjuna
References” believes Agamben is invoking Nāgārjuna – “the principle founder of the
Mādhyamika, or Middle Way, school” of Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism (DeCaroli
126). One reason for this is cursory; Agamben briefly mentions Nāgārjuna by name in
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one of his other books, Idea of Prose. The other reason is much more substantial.
DeCaroli says,
Whereas in earlier forms of Buddhism, awakening was equated with a
complete escape from saṃsāra (the everyday lived world of fixation,
habit, and suffering), the teaching of emptiness in the Mahāyāna tradition,
and especially within the stanzas that comprise [Nāgārjuna’s]
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, brought about a radical change by collapsing the
distinction between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. (130)
Very early traditions of Buddhism maintained a separation between normative, embodied
existence and nirvāṇa – a state or place of transcendence. Setting aside whether
DeCaroli’s characterization of Nāgārjuna’s writings and intellectual effect are accurate, it
is the case that later forms of Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism did begin to speak of
nirvāṇa as not independent from saṃsāra. If there is no difference between the world
(saṃsāra) and nirvāṇa, as Agamben states twice in The Coming Community, then the
problem of how to get from one place (the world) to another place
(transcendence/salvation/liberation) is rendered inoperative. As DeCaroli says:
But what, in fact, needs to be done does not involve the reclamation of a
lost world, or the establishment of a new one, but rather the adoption of a
new mode of perceiving and inhabiting the one we are now in. Nirvāṇa is
not a place but a way of being, a manner of awareness characterized by the
vulnerability of letting go of that which we never had. (131)
The micro-analyses of limbo and nirvāṇa help us to see how liberation functions with
respect to the coming community. The world is as it is, for Agamben, and to focus on
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changing the world in order to create a new, liberated world in the future repudiates the
temporality of the coming community discussed in section iii. “How, after all, can only
look forward to a moment one already occupies?” (DeCaroli, 123).
Davis makes a similar claim. In an opening address at the 2011 conference of the
International Herbert Marcuse Society, speaking of the open letter Tahir Square
dissenters wrote to Occupy Wall Street protesters, Davis said she was reminded of the
last line of June Jordan’s “Poem for South African Women”: we are the ones we have
been waiting for (CR 434). Davis believes this line to be particularly crucial for
understanding the nature of liberation struggles – including prison abolition. Davis then
says this line to the audience as a declarative statement: “we are the ones we have been
waiting for” (CR 434). What does it mean for “us” to be the ones we have been waiting
for? It means that those who are participating in struggles for liberation are actively
bringing to fruition the type of communities, ideologies, and practices they have been
waiting for. In other words, prison abolitionists take the abolition of the prison industrial
complex – a condition which is not-yet – and do not relegate it to a moment in the future
but make it present now. The alteration is one of perception and cognition; it is the
potential not-to – to render assumed, conceptual frameworks inoperable by undermining
the cognitive and linguistic scaffolds employed to perpetuate such frameworks.

v. Imagination revisited
Prison abolition is a necessary feature of Davis’s abolition democracy. As
outlined in the chapter on Davis, the imagination plays a crucial role in Davis’s critique
of the PIC and in the possibility for its eradication of the PIC. Davis’s abolition
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democracy signals less a series of policy reforms and more a conceptual shift – a much
broader and more complicated goal and one which is difficult to try and predict or plan.
Moreover, Davis and Agamben both propose that a conceptual shift or change needs to
occur in order to for us to recognize an already existent abolition democracy for Davis
and coming community for Agamben. Davis locates the imagination as being that which
can prompt (and impede) this conceptual shift. For Agamben, it is clear that how humans
think needs to be altered in order to render inoperative cognitive misunderstandings that
affect such notions as resistance and the state.44 In The Coming Community, Agamben
does not say that the “imagination” would be that which prompts this alternative way of
thinking. The context in which Agamben speaks about the imagination is a bit different
than Davis, but it is nonetheless just as important for thinking about the conceptual shift
needed in order to recognize the coming community. Agamben in his “Essay on the
Destruction of Experience” in the book Infancy and History links the “resulting reversal
of the status of the imagination” to “the change that has taken place in the meaning of
experience” (IH 27). Prior to unpacking how Agamben understands imagination, we
must first understand the claims Agamben makes about the transformation of the
meaning of experience.
Agamben begins the “Essay on the Destruction of Experience” by stating: “The
question of experience can be approached nowadays only with an acknowledgement that
it is no longer accessible to us” (IH 15). Referencing and expanding on Walter
Benjamin’s notion of the poverty of experience, Agamben claims that experience for
modern people has been destroyed. “As long ago as 1933 Benjamin had accurately
44

These are addressed in Chapter Five.
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diagnosed this ‘poverty of experience’ of the modern age; he located its origins in the
catastrophe of the First World War” (IH 15). Agamben agrees with Benjamin about the
diagnosis but claims that for “[t]oday, however, we know that the destruction of
experience no longer necessitates a catastrophe” (IH 15). Agamben believes that
everyday occurrences still cannot be “translated into experience” (IH 15). No matter how
“entertaining or tedious, unusual or common place, harrowing or pleasurable” the day’s
events are “none of them will have become experience” (IH 16). As Catherine Mills in
The Philosophy of Giorgio Agamben explains: “Agamben claims that the contemporary
age is marked by the destruction or loss of experience, in which the banality of everyday
life cannot be experienced per se but only undergone” (23). For Agamben, then, one
does not experience things like going to work, eating lunch, and reading the news but
undergoes these moments as a process. The purpose of Agamben’s essay is to recover a
forgotten meaning of experience and attempt to render a new conception of experience,
and unlike Benjamin who connects the destruction of experience to the First World War
(i.e. a catastrophe), Agamben “argues that this condition is in part brought about by the
rise of modern science and the split between the subject of experience and of knowledge
that it entails” (Mills 23).
For Agamben, the shift from the meaning of experience in the “traditional sense”
(i.e. Antiquity/classical thought) and the meaning of experience that “was implicit in the
founding project of modern science” is marked by a change in the understanding of the
subject (IH 19). Experience, for Antiquity (via the Greek philosophers Plato and
Aristotle), was understood as separate from knowledge whereas “in its search for
certainty, modern science abolishes this separation and makes experience the locus – the
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‘method’; that is, the pathway – of knowledge” (IH 22). With the birth of modern
science, the response to experience as being uncertain was to “displac[e] experience as
far as possible outside the individual: onto instruments and numbers” (IH 20).
Experience became that which could be measured, known, and certain. Agamben claims
that “[t]raditional experience…remains faithful to this separation of experience and
science” and does so by pointing out that experience and science were attached to
different subjects for classical thought (IH 21). “The subject of experience was common
sense, something existing in every individual…while the subject of science is the noūs or
the active intellect, which is separate from experience, ‘impassive’ and ‘divine’” (IH 20).
In modern science, these different subjects become one. The subject of experience and
the subject of knowledge transform into a single subject “which is none other than their
conjunction at an abstract Archimedean point: the Cartesian cogito, consciousness” (IH
22).
Returning to the imagination, we can begin to see what Agamben means when he
says: “Nothing can convey the extent of the change that has taken place in the meaning of
experience so much as the resulting reversal of the status of the imagination” (IH 27).
The imagination for classical thought had authority, and in unlike modern science, was
not thought of as unreal. “For Antiquity, the imagination which is now expunged from
knowledge as ‘unreal’, was the supreme medium of knowledge” (IH 27). Agamben
names the importance of dreams in classical thought as evidence for this connection
between the imagination and knowledge.
And since, according to Antiquity, it is the imagination which forms
dream images, this explains the particular relationship to truth which
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dreams have in the ancient world…and to efficacious knowledge. (IH 27)
Rather than the imagination being the way or mode of knowledge, experience is placed
outside of the subject and considered measurable. For classical thought, the imagination
“[a]s the intermediary between the senses and the intellect, enabling, in phantasy, the
union between the sensible form and the potential intellect, it occupies in ancient and
medieval culture exactly the same role that our culture assigns to experience” (IH 27).
Though Agamben’s main concern in this essay is experience, his comments about
the imagination are important. If the purpose of Agamben’s essay is to recover and then
attempt to rethink the concept of experience, then it is clear that implicit in this attempt is
a recovering and rethinking of the concept of the imagination. Like Davis, Agamben
gives high weight to the imagination both negatively and positively. Davis critiques the
imagination for being limited and obstructing human possibilities. Agamben traces how
the West currently thinks of the imagination. The way the imagination is considered is as
an obstruction. It is a subtle difference, but they are interconnected. Davis’s critique is
focused on use: how is the imagination used as a tool in the act of thinking. Is it limited
and preventing possibilities, or is it expanding possibilities/generating creative
approaches and conclusions? Agamben is focused on the explicit and implicit meanings a
culture has about the concept of the imagination: how is the term “imagination” defined,
and what is its relationship to knowledge – if any? Agamben is focused upon the use of
the concept of the imagination and its development within a culture over an extended
period of time.
In terms of the positive aspect, Davis believes the imagination is the impetus for
opening up possibilities to think in new ways and ultimately for helping to create the
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possibilities for change. Agamben’s entire corpus is filled with similar moves; that is, “it
is typical of his thought [that] the site of danger or destruction is also the site of salvation”
(Mills 23). For Agamben, it is the concept of experience that is both the problem and the
solution not the imagination as it is for Davis. However, as we have seen, the meaning of
the imagination is integral to the understanding of experience, and thus an alteration in
the meaning of the imagination would affect the understanding of experience.

vi. Political Ontology
Political and social action motived by discourse of creating a “new world” adopts
the normative conception of time as temporal passing. The focus is how to get from the
present world to the new (future) world. For Agamben, according to DeCaroli,
the problem is in the way we occupy this world, the way we
comport ourselves toward it, our disposition, or more philosophically
speaking the way our ontological commitment, which shape how we
conceive of ourselves and the world, become political commitments. (12930)
For this reason, ontology is political for Agamben. Proposing a re-interpretation of
ontology as impotentiality is not an inconsequential, abstract thought experiment.
Matthew Abbott in The Figure of this World: Agamben and the Question of Political
Ontology defines Agamben as a political ontologist. According to Abbott, political
ontology posits
…the inextricability of theory and practice (thought and politics)…: the
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task for thought is not to prescribe action, but to practice a thinking that
tracks the conditions of the possibility of radical change. (188)
The description of political ontology is particularly helpful in considering not only
Agamben’s work but Davis’s as well. From what we have discussed about Agamben’s
The Coming Community, (e.g. whatever being, irreparable, limbo), prescriptive action is
clearly not his focus. Abbott goes on to say that for the political ontologist, “the political
task is not to put theoretical or philosophic ideas ‘into practice’ but to think practically by
experimenting with new political forms” (Abbott 188). Davis clearly experiments with
new political forms, but she does not address nor demonstrate effective means of
complicating the discourse to advance the prison abolitionist project. Agamben’s
rendering of ontology in terms of impotentiality and its political consequences on self and
community is a demonstrative practice of imaginative thinking that preserves Davis’s
non-linear temporality and her claim regarding the struggle for liberation as indefinite.
Thus, Agamben offers a possible blueprint for where to begin the cognitive re-orientation
vital for the prison abolitionist project: abolishing the conditions which allow for the
prison industrial complex to be an unquestioned, inevitable part of social reality.
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CHAPTER 5. RESISTENCE, LAW, AND THE STATE

i. Introduction
Herman Wallace, Robert King, and Albert Woodfox are known as the Angola
Three. They were imprisoned in the early 1970’s in a maximum-security Louisiana State
Penitentiary, known simply as “Angola” – named for the African country of many of its
earlier enslaved occupants. The sprawling prison is on the grounds of a former slave
plantation and to this day inmates work in the prison’s fields picking cotton overseen by
armed guards on horseback. Wallace first went to prison in 1971 for armed robbery.
Wallace, along with Woodfox and King, formed one of the first prison chapters of the
Black Panther Party – organizing inmates to oppose the systemic violence and sexual
slavery that pervaded the institution.
Wallace and Woodfox were convicted for the 1972 murder of a prison guard,
Brent Miller. No physical evidence linked the men to the crime. A bloody fingerprint at
the scene, which belonged neither to Wallace nor Woodfox, was ignored by authorities.
Wallace and Woodfox believe they were targeted by officials because of their political
organizing work. After their conviction in 1974, they were put in solitary confinement
along with King, who was being punished for another crime. King’s conviction would be
overturned twenty-nine years later; all twenty-nine years served in solitary confinement.
Woodfox’s conviction was overturned three times, but each time the state either
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successfully appealed the judge’s decision or convened a grand jury to indict Woodfox
and try him again. Woodfox was finally released on February 16, 2016 after spending
over forty-three years in solitary confinement.
On October 1, 2013, a Federal Judge ordered Wallace’s release and overturned his
conviction due to an improperly chosen grand jury that excluded women jurors in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wallace was suffering with advanced stages of
liver cancer and was given days to live by the time of his release. The state appealed the
ruling, but the judge quickly responded with another order that said failure to release
Wallace from custody would result in a judgment of contempt. So, at 7:30 p.m., the night
of October 1, seventy-one year old Wallace was released from prison – after nearly fortytwo years in solitary confinement – and left in an ambulance that took him directly to a
New Orleans’ hospital. Attempts at gaining compassionate release were denied as early
as July 2013 when Wallace’s condition became extremely grave.
Fifty-eight hours after his release, on the morning of Friday, October 4, 2013,
Wallace died in the hospital. Family, friends, and supporters feared the advanced stages
of his illness would prevent him from even knowing he was released from prison. The
people surrounding Wallace said he uttered these words in the hospital before he died: “I
am free. I am free.”
At the time of his death, Wallace served more time in consecutively solitary
confinement than any other U.S. inmate. Within the first forty-eight hours of his release,
District Attorney Sam D’Aquilla was able to get a grand jury to re-indict Wallace. The
swiftness the state of Louisiana moved to re-indict Wallace, who was hours away from
death, without any physical evidence linking Wallace to the crime as well as the wife of
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the prison guard who was killed publicly supporting Wallace’s claims to innocence was
excessively cruel. On October 5, 2013, D’Aquilla responded to an email I had sent to
him45 in the following way:
[G]lad for your input. [H]e was a murderer and it's sad he could not fulfill
his obligation to the state of Louisiana. Sam
What does it mean to have an obligation to the state? Why was nearly forty-two years of
solitary confinement considered to be unsatisfactory for the state? Why did the district
attorney, a representative of the state of Louisiana, move to quickly to re-indict Wallace?
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualize the state’s overreaction to
Wallace’s release using Davis’s analysis of the political prisoner, the history of the
struggle for black liberation as it relates to the law, and Agamben’s characterization of
the incident at Tiananmen Square in 1989 as offering a display, or gesture, of the coming
community. The district attorney’s actions towards Wallace and his insistence that
Wallace had an obligation to the state is a micro-level example of Agamben’s reinterpretation of the resistance at Tiananmen Square. In the previous chapters, Agamben
offered a way to alter our cognitive framework about ontology that would aid in the
imagining of a prisonless society. This chapter ends with a suggestion of a strategy for
resistance that would align and advance the prison abolitionist project by undermining the
racial and economic inequality and oppression that define the PIC.

District Attorney Sam D’Aquilla: The decision to re-indict Herman Wallace before he died perpetuates
the most ubiquitous kind of violence - far more pervasive and far more violent than any act a person you
have prosecuted may have committed. The tragedy for you, however, is that you do not realize how this
could be the case. A. Pommerening
45
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ii. Political prisoners and the state
The goals accompanying Davis’s aforementioned “networks of resistance” and
“communities of struggle” are political, and the target of criticism is most often
hegemonic practices believed to be unjust and are often enshrined with the blessing of the
state. The state is the apparatus of governance of a particular geo-political collective
generally associated with a nation and has identifiable – though malleable – boarders.
Laws are articulated, applied, and enforced through the state or one of its sanctioned
apparatuses. Laws are neither just nor unjust and do not necessarily apply in the same
manner to all individuals that constitute members (or residents) of a particular state.
Davis rightly points out that “we naturally assume that justice and equality are
necessarily produced through law. But the law on its own cannot create justice and
equality” (AD 92).
The political prisoner, for Davis, has a unique relationship to the law and
therefore also to the state. Prior to apprehension, the political prisoner is a political
dissenter. In the essay, “Political Prisoners, Prisons, and Black Liberation,” first
published in 1971, Davis writes, that the dissenter’s “words or deeds have in one form or
another embodied political protests against the established order and have consequently
brought [the dissenter] into acute conflict with the state” (41). The movement from
political dissenter, or activist, to political prisoner can happen whether or not the
dissenter has broken any laws. Regardless of whether a criminal offense was committed,
…the political prisoner has violated the unwritten law which prohibits
disturbances and upheavals in the status quo…This unwritten law has been
contested by actually and explicitly breaking a law or by using
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constitutionally protected channels to educate, agitate, and organize the
masses to resist. (PP 41)
Though the political prisoner becomes incarcerated for an alleged criminal act (i.e.
transgressing a written law), the transgression, Davis argues, is actually the dissenter’s
political act, which directly challenges the hegemonic order. Therefore, “[t]he offense of
the political prisoner is political boldness, the persistent challenging – legal or extra-legal
– of fundamental social wrongs fostered and reinforced by the state” (PP 42).
Agamben reinforces Davis’s point about the gravity of the political dissenter’s
challenge to the state. For Agamben, law is already inscribed with considerations for the
fact of the matter; that is, the rule of law is not nor ever has been transcendent. Since
antiquity, it has contained exceptions for particular circumstances. In Agamben and the
Politics of Human Rights, co-authors John Lechte and Saul Newman explain, “the law as
such, for a very long time, made way for its own suspension in light of an arising
situation (for example, a state of emergency)” (3). Law allows for circumstances which
actually halt the rule of law. In a state of emergency, the facts of the matter are such that
the rule of law is suspended. Law is not transcendent; there is no pure or ideal form of
law.
The example of the state of emergency highlights the predominant consideration
for suspending the rule of law: security. If the security of the nation-state is threatened,
“[t]he law, in such a situation, is viewed as an ideal that must be suspended in light of the
real state of affairs” (Lechte and Newman 4). 46 The political dissenter embodies this
threat to the state as Davis described. At some point along the political dissenter’s
46

On a global, geo-political scale, Agamben sees instances of this suspension accelerating since modernity.
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activities, the rule of law is suspended and forms of illegal or extra-judicial surveillance,
detainment, assassination, disappearance, and imprisonment are all used to mitigate the
threat to the hegemonic order.
Ultimately, for Agamben, the threat to the security of the state is constant. As
Lechte and Newman summarize:
The “situation” is what a state of emergency is intended to address. But if
the situation is always prevalent, when it coincides with the norm – as is
the case with the security of the state – law, in a fundamental sense, is
continually suspended. (4) 47
In the aftermath of attacks on the World Trade centers on September 11, 2001,
warrantless surveillance, bulk collection of data, the Fisa court, President Obama’s
command to assassinate U.S. citizens in a foreign country with drones without charge,
and ethnic and religious profiling are instances in which the suspension of law in the
United States has impacted citizens. Such states of exception are also, as Agamben
describes with reference to the camp, accompanied by horrendous violence. Torture,
disappearing people, war, mass executions, violent suppression of demonstrations,
indefinite detention, medical neglect, and forced starvation are the means in which the
state (any nation-state or localized sovereign entities) maintains itself in the name of
security when the rule of law is suspended.
Security, on multifarious levels, centers on protection from perceived threats.
People install home security systems in their homes to protect themselves and their
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This reasoning is behind the often cited, and contested, claim by Agamben in Homo Sacer: Sovereign
Power and Bare Life that the camp used by Nazi Germany signals the political space of modernity itself.
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belongings from threats. Individuals may have or carry weapons, like mace or guns, for
protection from potential threats of attack. Persons or communities may seek ways of
protecting themselves from the violent threat of law enforcement or vice-versa. The
military is used for the purposes of security of the nation-state. Threat, in most of these
cases, is thought of in direct terms, whether ideological (e.g. political dissenters) and/or
physical (e.g. bodily harm). Davis claims:
One of our main challenges is to reconceptualize the notion of “security.”
How can we help to make the world secure from the ravages of global
capitalism? This broader sense of security might involve debt relief for
Africa; it would mean an end to the juggernaut of privatization that
threatens the new society people in South Africa have been trying to build.
It would involve the shifting of priorities from the prison industrial
complex to education, housing, health care. (AD 89).

iii. Resistance: Black liberation and the law
Such social wrongs, in the context of the United States, have and continue to be
perpetuated through the law: inscribing practices and behaviors legally permissible as
well as explicitly defining those that are prohibited. For example, it was the case that
racial, chattel slavery was legally permitted; however, it was not the case that all citizens
(at the time, narrowly defined) were required by law to own slave/s. There was no statesanctioned punishment for those, who by law, were permitted to own slaves but did not.
The law allowed for slave ownership but did not use punitive means to discourage the
practice of not owning slave/s. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 and the Fugitive Slave
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Act of 1850, on the other hand, explicitly deemed certain actions unlawful. The fugitive
slave laws were enacted to dissuade the practice of willfully or complacently aiding a
slave’s escape through punitive means. Speaking of the Underground Railroad, in the
essay “Political Prisoners, Prisons, and Black Liberation,” Davis describes it as operating
in “flagrant violation of the fugitive slave laws; those who were apprehended were
subjected to severe penalties” (40).
Continuing in this essay, Davis notes the struggle for black liberation (from antislavery resistance to the Twenty-first century) used both extra-legal and legal modes of
resistance. Violence and arson, escape, the Underground Railroad, were examples of
extra-legal modes of resistance while abolitionist publications and organization,
legislative efforts, purchasing one’s own or another’s freedom were legal modes of
resistance to the lawful practice of chattel slavery. As discussed in Chapter Two, not
only is slavery still legally permitted, but new laws were created to ensure the
continuation of anti-black racism and white supremacy. The Black Codes being one
instance of this and another being that “in the presence of now freed Black labor, the vote
was offered to unpropertied White men” (Brewer & Heitzeg 631). The terrain for the
struggle for black liberation evolved from emancipation to a focus on equal access to
social and economic opportunities/resources; in addition, the struggle continued for an
end to physical, verbal, and psychological intimidation as well as being tortured and
killed, with impunity, for spectacle or sport. During this period,
White supremacy in the laws was accomplished by the introduction of a
series of segregationist Jim Crow laws, a new model for essentialist racial
paradigm that was legitimated by so-called biology; the laws did not
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mandate that Blacks be according equality under the law because nature –
not man, not power, not violence – has determined their degraded status.
(Brewer and Heitzeg 631).
The post-slavery and civil rights era are defined by their struggle against this adapted
form of white supremacy – which existed across the United States, not just in the
segregationist South. The extra-legal and legal modes of resistance during this era
included: sit-ins, violence, community education and health care, protests, court cases,
legislative efforts, self-empowerment and expression, boycotts,48 and working within
existing law.49
Without question, the activism and resistance efforts of the civil rights era had
positive impacts on legal, social, and cultural fronts. However, as was the case with the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, there were unforeseen and unintended
consequences of the changes linked with the civil rights era. Davis says, “The focus of
the civil rights movement was precisely one effecting change in prevailing laws. But at
the same time, the law produced the limits of these possible changes” (AD 93). Whether
through extra-legal or legal modes of resistance, the success of changing prevailing laws
need not lead to racial equality and equal protection under the law.
The grand achievement of civil rights was to purge the laws of its
reference to specific kinds of bodies, thus enabling racial equality before
the law. But at the same time this process enabled racial inequality in the
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Though boycotts, in the United States, seem to be legal action, Martin Luther King, Jr and other
organizers had warrants issued for their arrests during the Montgomery Bus Boycott for obstructing
business operations.
49
Huey P. Newton, co-founder of the Black Panther Party, learned, while taking classes at San Francisco
Law School, it was legal in the state of California to carry guns in public as long as the guns were visible.
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sense that the law was deprived of its capacity to acknowledge people as
racialized, as coming from racialized communities. (AD 93)
Prior to the civil rights movement, the enforcement and application of the law and
punitive consequences could be enacted in a blatantly racist manner. Aspects of the civil
rights movement sought to make the enforcement, application, and punitive consequences
for breaking the law equal for all people.
Rather than ending legalized racial discrimination, the criminal justice system in
the post-civil rights era has actually become the predominant means for continuing racial
(and economic) hegemony.
The essentialist racist paradigm [has given] way to the new color-blind
racism where race and racism are ostensibly absent from the law and all
aspects of its enforcement. The criminal justice system provides a
convenient vehicle for physically maintaining the old legally enforced
color lines. (Brewer & Heitzeg 633)
Laws, and the criminal justice system more broadly, may be absent of references to race
(and class) but its application and execution is targeted. The hyper-policing of poor
communities of color, over-loaded and sometimes professionally negligent public
defenders, the corrosive use of plea deals, mandatory minimums, and felony three-strike
laws have accelerated the incarceration rate in the post-civil rights era.
Though the term “mass incarceration” has gained popularity in academia and
popular media, Wacquant takes issue with the term because it ignores the targeted use of
the criminal justice system. For Wacquant, “mass incarceration suggestions that
confinement concerns large swaths of citizenry….implying that the penal net has been
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flung far and wide across social and physical space” (78). The United States does have
the highest incarceration rate in the world, but for Wacquant, “mass” denotes “broad and
indiscriminate” (78). However, “the expansion and intensification of the activities of the
police, courts, and prisons…[has] been finely targeted” by class, race, and place. The
appropriate term for Wacquant is hyperincarceration, and the “cumulative targeting has
led to the hyperincarceration of one particular category” – lower class African American
men from crumbling urban centers (78). Trends in police activity are disjointed from
trends in crime, mandatory minimum sentencing have been applied racially (e.g. crack vs.
cocaine), the use of the legal system to remove children from school for behavioral
reasons or charge them as adults are some of the ways that colorblind racism targets poor
communities of color. Given the direct line from racial, chattel slavery to free/cheap
inmate labor discussed in Chapter Two, the “exploitation of Black labor continues, made
permissible, indeed possible with the law” in the era of colorblind racism (Brewer &
Heitzeg 638).
Davis acknowledges that racial and class-based exploitation and inequality have
been able to continue – in different forms – despite changes in the law. She believes that
legal and/or extra-legal modes of resistance “need to find ways of contesting the absolute
authority of the law” (AD 92). She goes on to add, “This requires a dual strategy of
taking up the law and recognizing its limitations in order to address that which the law
cannot apprehend” (AD 94).
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iv. Resistance: Tiananmen and moving prison abolition forward
The issues which Davis raises about the challenges of the legal and extra-legal
modes of resistance that ultimately see law as being the recourse for combatting social
wrongs is significant. Law, as previously discussed, is written and executed by the state.
The state and the PIC are not separate entities; they are intimately blended. Prison
abolition must rectify “the multifaceted role of the state in producing and entrenching
marginality” (Wacquant 75). As Davis has shown in the example of the civil rights
movement and as Agamben has reinforced in his discussion of the state of emergency,
law need not ensure equality and social justice – no matter how just the law appears to be
written. A mode of resistance that refuses to become placated or absorbed by changes in
the law while simultaneously holding at the forefront the original target of the political
dissenter’s criticism (i.e. the state) could be a viable route for realizing prison abolition
and ultimately undermining what Davis describes as “the ravages of global capitalism”
altogether (AD 89). Agamben re-interprets the incident at Tiananmen Square as a mode
of resistance that extended from an example of the coming community. The ways in
which Agamben identifies it as being radical, or revolutionary, offers a potential strategy
for Davis and other prison abolitionists.
Agamben begins the final chapter of The Coming Community with the following
question:
WHAT COULD be the politics of whatever singularity, that is, of a being
whose community is mediated not by any condition of belonging (being
red, being Italian, being Communist) nor by the simple absence of
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conditions (a negative community, such as that recently proposed in
France by Maurice Blanchot), but by belonging itself? (CC 83)
Agamben claims to have found “elements of a response” in the Tiananmen
demonstrations (CC 88). Prior to discussing what elements Agamben sees in the
Tiananmen demonstrations that exhibit a “politics of whatever singularity,” it is
important to reiterate Agamben’s rejection of Blanchot’s “negative community” (CC 88).
As de la Durantye clarifies, “The ‘negative community’ that Blanchot invoked is, for
Agamben, insufficient because it takes only the first step toward revisiting the idea of
community; it knows what to reject but not what to put in its place” (170). Mirroring
Davis’s commitment to the negative-positive aspects of abolition, Agamben positively
identifies in the Tiananmen Square incident as an extension of the coming community.
For Agamben, resistance which existentially challenges the authority of the state
is an action, event, movement, or demonstration that is absent of a list of demands; that is,
there is no determinate political goal at all. In other words, using Agamben’s discourse
of impotentiality, “what Agamben found exemplary about the demonstrations in Beijing
was not what they demanded but what they did not demand” (de la Durantye 170).
Agamben says of Tiananmen:
[w]hat was most striking about the demonstrations of the Chinese May
was the relative absence of determinate contents in their demands
(democracy and freedom are notions too generic and broadly defined to
constitute the real object of a conflict, and the only concrete demand, the
rehabilitation of Hu Yao-Bang, was immediately granted). (CC 85)
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This absence of political demands threatens the very existence of the state as such by
undermining the state’s legitimacy as the mechanism for granting such political demands.
A society whose central strategy for control is observation and localized
containment sees its greatest threat in that which it cannot identify. Such
seemingly disorganized and unmotivated resistance is, from this point of
view, the very last thing but anodyne. (de la Durantye 171)
Davis believes political goals, not political identities, are how we should form
communities of struggle, and she also correctly admits that “once one becomes integrated
into state structures, it becomes increasingly difficult to think about ways of developing
radical oppositional practices” (CB 311). This is why Davis takes an abolitionist
approach to the PIC rather than a reformist approach. A reformist wants to change
particular aspects of a system – in this case the criminal justice system – but still assumes
the validity of the system. An abolitionist challenges the validity of the system itself.
Davis never explicitly states that a lack of political demands is a potential strategy
to advance the prison abolitionist project, but Davis’s dismissal of non-essential identity
and focus on political goals in concert with her concept of continuous struggle makes
Agamben’s suggestion (i.e. lack of political demands) a plausible strategy. Demands and
goals are not equivalent. To think of the individual-community in creative and
experimental ways for the purposes of forming networks of resistance is already a
political goal.50 A list of demands expressed to the state gives the impression that if the
listed conditions were met, struggle for liberation would no longer be necessary. In
Tiananmen, Agamben sees the lack of political demands as an instance when the
50

The end of Chapter Four talked about the connection between ontology and politics.
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protesters preferred not to; they preferred not to act in the expected way. For Agamben,
if nothing is demanded, the state is rendered inoperable. That state no longer has validity
if it is not being engaged.
The danger to the hegemonic order of Davis’s notion of liberation is less about
economically, racially, politically, and/or ethnically oppressed peoples uniting to
somehow overthrow capitalism or end racial and economic segregation. Davis’s notion
of liberation, as Agamben shows us, challenges the very existence of “political” as we
have come to know it. Agamben ends The Coming Community with an ominous remark
that encapsulates the response of the state to the existential threat Tiananmen posed.
Whatever singularity, which wants to appropriate belonging itself, its own
being-in-language, and thus rejects all identity and every condition of
belonging, is the principal enemy of the State. Wherever these
singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common there will be a
Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear. (CC 87).
The brutal response of the state at Tiananmen offers a way to explain the actions of the
state of Louisiana with respect to Herman Wallace outlined at the beginning of this
chapter. Wallace was not demonstrating, and he, himself, was physically unable to
participate in the legal fight for his release. However, hours away from death – slipping
in and out of consciousness – the state of Louisiana’s legal apparatus was of no
consequence to Wallace. Wallace, because of illness, simply stopped engaging and
validating the authority of the state. As Agamben said, this is the greatest threat to the
state. The district attorney, acting on behalf of the state, moved with such resolve and
viciousness to get Wallace back in its custody only so Wallace could die under state
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control. Wallace did not die in prison and inexplicably his “freed” status and the location
of his death means he did not “fulfill his obligation to the state.”
To take prison abolition serious is to take serious radical alterations in thinking,
communicating, and acting. The understanding and use of being, self, community, time,
imagination, resistance, liberation is all part of the fodder of the transformation. Prison
abolition presents the same type of threat to the state as Tiananmen. A prison abolitionist
cannot create a list of demands to ask of the state. Prison abolition threatens the state in a
similar way that Tiananmen did, and as Agamben stated: “sooner or later, the tanks will
appear” (CC 87). And so the struggle continues.
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